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ABSTRACT
In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco declared Latin America to be a
nuclear weapons-free zone, but this goal remains unfulfilled. Argentina and
Brazil, the Latin American nations most capable of building nuclear
weapons, refuse to comply with the treaty. Argentine and Brazilian
military leaders pursued the development of nuclear weapons from the
1970s to the late 1980s. The emergence of democratic regimes during the
1980s encouraged the gradual "denuclearization" of weapons research in
these nations. In July 1991, the presidents of Argentina and Brazil signed
an accord in Guadalajara, Mexico, each promising to abandon the
development of nuclear weapons. The risks of nuclear proliferation may be
reduced because of this agreement.
The Guadalajara Accord offers hope that nuclear proliferation in
Latin America can be slowed and perhaps stopped. The establishment of
civilian control over the military and the reduction in the belligerent rivalry
between Argentina and Brazil are central factors in ending the quest for
nuclear weapons. The firm commitment of these civilian leaders to pursue
only peaceful nuclear activities is a positive sign. The adoption of IAEA full-
scope safeguards in Argentina and Brazil will be the best guarantee for a
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 18 July 1991, President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and
President Carlos Menem of Argentina met in Guadalajara, Mexico to sign
an accord. They agreed to abandon the development of nuclear weapons in
their nations. This is the latest step in the rapprochement between two
historic rivals. The agreement obligates Argentina and Brazil to "prohibit
and impede" in their countries the "testing, use, or manufacture of any type
of nuclear weapon." It also prohibits the storage or deployment of nuclear
weapons supplied by third parties. 1 This agreement promises to be an
important success in the effort to prevent the global proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Argentina and Brazil have aggressively pursued nuclear weapons
since the 1970s. The risks of nuclear proliferation may be reduced because
of this agreement.
This thesis analyzes the efforts by Presidents Collor and Menem to
end the nuclear competition between their nations. Some members of the
armed forces in Argentina and Brazil oppose the Guadalajara agreement.
Will this agreement overcome domestic military opposition and end the
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rivalry? Can the Guadalajara agreement
complete the creation of a nuclear weapons-free continent begun by the
Treaty of Tlatelolco?
1
"No Mass Destruction Weapons," Latin American Regional Reports:
Southern Cone Report (RS-91-06, 8 August 1991), 8.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, completed in 1967, was the world's first
attempt to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in a populated area. 2
However, the treaty is called an idealistic failure because Brazil and
Argentina, the Latin American nations most capable of building nuclear
weapons3
,
have refused to comply with the treaty. Lewis A. Dunn describes
the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a partial success or "draw" in the international
effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In Dunn's view, the Treaty
of Tlatelolco succeeded in the creation of "an almost nuclear-free zone." The
conspicuous absence of Argentina and Brazil prevents the treaty from being
called a success. Therefore, Dunn concluded that "the Treaty of Tlatelolco
remains as much nuclear non-proliferation promise as reality."4
The recent actions by the civilian presidents of Brazil and Argentina
offer hope for achieving the goal of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In July 1991,
President Menem declared that "from this point on, nuclear development
will be for peace, never for death." Menem stated that "it is quite possible"
2 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty succeeded in prohibiting all nuclear weapons
testing, deployment, and storage of radioactive waste disposal on the largely
unpopulated continent. See G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International
Political System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 340-360.
3 See Chapter V. History of Nuclear Programs
4 Lewis A. Dunn, "Four Decades of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Some
Lessons from Wins, Losses, and Draws," in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New
Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery
Capabilities in the Third World (Lanham, Maryland: University of America
Inc., 1990), 249.
that Argentina and Brazil will end up signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 5
What are the justifications for such optimism regarding the Brazilian-
Argentine agreement signed in Guadalajara?
A democratic Zeitgeist has swept through Latin America over the past
decade. The renewed legitimacy of democracy has attracted international
attention to the possibility for stable democracies in Argentina, Uruguay,
Brazil, and Chile. In 1989, even Paraguay had its "democratic spirits
boosted" by the overthrow of General Stroessner, the hemisphere's longest
serving dictator. 6
The rise of democratic regimes in Argentina and Brazil has reduced
the military competition and distrust between these two nations. There
appears to be a relationship between the process of democratization and
gradual "denuclearization" in Argentina and Brazil. The civilian leaders
have taken steps to reduce friction between their nations and have promised
to abandon nuclear weapons programs begun during past military regimes.
The potential for a military backlash against these civilian initiatives
cannot be ignored. Will the success of any effort to end nuclear weapons
research be dependent upon the strengthening of democracy in both
5
"Argentina, Brazil Sign Nuclear Treaty," (in Spanish), NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS, 18 July 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-139, 19 July 1991), 26.
6 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Eds., Democracy
in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1989), 52.
nations? What are the reasons for hope (and grounds for skepticism) that a
nuclear weapons-free Latin America envisioned by the Treaty of Tlatelolco
will be achieved?
This thesis contains eight chapters. First, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is
examined to show how its basic flaws are partially the result of the
enduring distrust between Argentina and Brazil. The next chapter identifies
the requirements for building an atomic weapon. The third chapter briefly
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards in preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Fourth, the nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil are
addressed in detail to show how both nations have crossed the thin line
separating peaceful nuclear research from the pursuit of atomic weapons.
The fifth chapter explains how the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear competition
is a result of the historical rivalry between these nations. Sixth, the
relationship between democratization and the declining nuclear rivalry
between Argentina and Brazil is explored. The end of military rule has
coincided with the "denuclearization" of weapons research programs in both
nations.
The seventh chapter examines the costs and benefits of the
Guadalajara agreement for Argentina and Brazil. The Guadalajara
agreement is the latest step in the process of nuclear rapprochement. Can
the verification procedures established in this accord guarantee an end to
the secretive nuclear weapons programs pursued by the Argentine and
Brazilian militaries? Do the newborn democratic governments have the
strength to ensure enduring civilian supremacy over the armed forces?
The final chapter explores the implications of the Guadalajara Accord
for U.S. non-proliferation policy. The conclusion proposes different policy
options available to the United States.
II. HISTORY OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
In the early 1960s, the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in Latin America began under the leadership of Brazil. In 1961,
Brazilian President Joao Goulart sent a draft resolution to the United
Nations General Assembly proposing the creation of a nuclear weapons-free
zone in Latin America. Brazil feared that any regional acquisition of nuclear
weapons would stimulate an extremely expensive and dangerous arms race.
Goulart stated that because no nuclear weapons were present in the region,
their introduction would be destabilizing.
Goulart was Brazil's president from August 1961 until the March
1964 military coup. Despite the growing tensions between Goulart (a
civilian) and the military, the Brazilian armed forces supported his initial
anti-nuclear stance because they feared Argentina's technological
advantages in nuclear research. However, after the coup, the Brazilian
enthusiasm for a nuclear weapons-free zone declined under the first
military president, General Castello e Branco. 7
The initial Argentine reaction to Goulart's proposal was skeptical.
However, the rest of Latin American received the proposal with enthusiasm.
Cuba eagerly supported the proposal. Cuba amended the proposal to
7 Bolivar Lamounier, "Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy," in Diamond,
Linz and Lipset, Eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, 124-126.
included Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone. Cuba called for the
removal of all foreign military bases from Latin America (especially the U.S.
naval station at Guantcinamo Bay). The United States opposed the Cuban
amendment and exerted pressure on the United Nations General Assembly
not to vote on the resolution during 196 1.8
The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the destabilizing potential of
nuclear weapons and fueled fears of dangerous nuclear proliferation in the
region. Many Latin American nations feared being drawn into the rage of a
superpower conflict.9 In 1963, President Joao Goulart initiated the Five
Presidents' Declaration calling for a nuclear weapons-free Latin America.
The presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico signed the
declaration. First, they believed that the absence of nuclear weapons would
reduce the danger of being targeted with nuclear weapons by either
superpower. Second, they thought the introduction of nuclear weapons
might cause political instability and increase regional tensions. The United
Nations General Assembly formally supported the Five Presidents'
Declaration on 27 November 1963.
8 Atkins, Latin America, 337.
9 The Soviet Union made a pledge following the Cuban missile crisis not to
place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. However, nuclear-capable ships and
aircraft of the Soviet Union have made regular port visits in Cuba. See William
M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the
Arms Race (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985), 138, 264.
After the Brazilian military coup in 1964, Mexico assumed a
leadership role in the anti-nuclear weapons movement, sponsoring a
conference in November 1965 to prepare a draft treaty. Ever since
Argentina refused to sign the Five Presidents' Declaration, Brazil suspected
Argentina of having intentions to develop nuclear weapons. The 1966
military coup in Argentina heightened the suspicions of Brazil. At the same
time, the Brazilian military adopted the "Doctrine of National Security."
This doctrine gave the Brazilian armed forces a greater role in economic
policy, internal security, and suppression of leftist opposition groups. 10 The
military governments in both Argentina and Brazil made national security
issues a top priority, creating a vicious cycle of distrust between these
nations.
The treaty negotiations took more than two years because of
disagreements over transit rights for nuclear-capable ships and aircraft. The
second reason for the prolonged negotiations concerned the "entry into force"
provisions.
The dispute over the transport of nuclear weapons on ships and
aircraft pitted the United States against most Latin American governments.
The United States insisted on freedom for ships and aircraft with nuclear
weapons to transit through Latin America. Many Latin American
10 Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 6.
8
representatives at the treaty negotiations claimed that the United States
position undermined the entire purpose of the treaty. The Mexican
delegates were most adamant that U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons in
Latin American waters would be a gross violation of the intent of a nuclear
weapons-free zone. 11 The U.S. delegates were, however, successful in
ensuring that the treaty allowed the free transit of ships and aircraft
throughout the region. The United States also maintained its policy of
"neither confirming nor denying" (NCND) the presence of nuclear weapons
on any of its ships or aircraft. 12
The second point of contention during the treaty negotiations
concerned the "entry into force" provisions. A treaty "enters into force" when
a party to the treaty completes the ratification process. The signing of the
treaty document is only the first step. Ratification by the nation's
legislature is also required.
The distrust between Argentina and Brazil made each unwilling to
allow the treaty to become effective until the other complied with all treaty
obligations. Brazil would not comply with the treaty until Argentina
11 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Additional Protocol I To
The Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America (95th
Congress, 2nd Session, 15 August 1978), 47.
12 Appendix A addresses the issue of nuclear transit rights for ships and
aircraft under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There has been far less opposition to
port visits by nuclear weapons-capable U.S. Navy ships in Latin America than
in many other areas of the world, such as New Zealand and Japan.
9
completed the ratification process, and Argentina made a similar demand.
Therefore, Article 28 requires the ratification of the treaty by every Latin
American nation before the treaty can enter into force. The treaty allows
individual signatories to waive the entry into force provision. Of the 26
signatories, only three have refused to waive this provision: Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile. 13
Treaty ratification is a two-step process. First, each nation must
deposit "an instrument of ratification" with the treaty organization office in
Mexico that documents legislative approval of the pact. Second, the
signatory nation must complete safeguard negotiations with the IAEA. As a
result of Article 28, the Treaty of Tlatelolco has not prevented the pursuit of
nuclear weapons by either Argentina or Brazil.
Despite these two important limitations, the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed on 14
February 1967. The treaty headquarters are in Tlatelolco (a section of
Mexico City), and the treaty is therefore known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
The treaty called for the total prohibition of the use, deployment and
manufacture of nuclear weapons in the region. The preamble of the Treaty
of Tlatelolco claimed that the military denuclearization of Latin America
would have the following benefits:
13 Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and
International Agreements (Philadelphia: Talyor and Francis, 1985), 805.
10
[The Treaty of Tlatelolco] will spare the peoples [of Latin America] from
the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and
will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories,
and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and
complete disarmament. 14
The basic treaty is only for Latin American signatories. It outlaws the
"testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means
whatsoever of any nuclear weapons." The treaty allows signatories to
pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but requires complete compliance
with IAEA safeguards. In 1969, the Treaty of Tlatelolco Council established
the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(OPANAL) was established as an addition control mechanism to
complement the IAEA. OPANAL is far less effective than the IAEA because
of inadequate funding.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains two protocols in addition to the
basic document. Protocol I "commits external states with dependent
territories inside the zone to place those territories under the same
restrictions." Protocol I is for the four nations with territorial holdings in
Latin America: France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the
United States. 15 Protocol II asked the global nuclear powers to respect the
14 Preamble of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, see Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia
of UN Agreements , 803.
15
All nations (except France) with territorial holdings in Latin America
have ratified Protocol I: the United Kingdom in 1969, the Netherlands in 1970,
11
"non-nuclear status of Latin America, and not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against them." 16 The declared global nuclear powers are
the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and
China. All five of these nations have signed and ratified Protocol II.
The United Nations General Assembly enthusiastically endorsed the
treaty on 5 December 1967. The General Assembly was optimistic that a
nuclear-free zone in Latin America would be easier to maintain than
elsewhere in the Third World. 17 This optimism resulted from three factors.
First, the regional disputes in Latin America were not as likely to explode
as in many other areas of the Third World. Second, the common cultural
background and growing economic interdependence made tensions between
Latin American neighbors less volatile than in other parts of the globe.
Finally, nuclear weapons have not become a part of the security posture of
any country in the region. Therefore, the costs involved in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons would discourage their development. 18
Despite the optimism of the General Assembly, the Treaty of
Tlatelolco has achieved only qualified success over the past twenty-four
years. Table I provides a list of the ways that the Treaty of Tlatelolco has
and the United States in 1981. See Atkins, Latin America, 338.
16 Atkins, Latin America, 338.
17 Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of UN Agreements , 803.
18 Michael A. Morris and Victor Millan, Controlling Latin American
Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 117-129.
12
not achieved its goal of creating a nuclear weapons-free continent in Latin
America.
Table I
Why the Treaty of Tlatelolco Remains Incomplete
a. The United States has insisted on transit rights for nuclear
weapons on ships and aircraft.
b. France has not ratified Protocol I.
c. Seven nations in Latin America have not signed the treaty. Of
these nations, only Cuba has a nuclear program. Cuba refuses
to sign the treaty, allegedly in protest over the U.S. naval base
at Guantanamo Bay.
d. Full-scope IAEA safeguards negotiations are not completed
for all signatories (especially in Argentina and Brazil).
e. Argentina has not ratified the treaty.
f. Brazil and Chile have not waived "entry into force" provisions.
The United States position on nuclear transit rights continues to be
controversial in Latin America. The presence of any nuclear weapons in the
region (even at sea) undermines the "spirit" of the treaty for many Latin
Americans. The United States recently took steps to reduce this nuclear
transit rights controversy. President Bush announced the withdrawal and
placing into storage of all nuclear weapons from U.S. surface ships and
13
attack submarines on 27 September 1991. 19 This move by President Bush
reduces the peacetime importance of the U.S. position on transit rights of
nuclear weapons in the region, although the United States may deploy such
weapons at sea in crisis or wartime situations.
The French refusal to ratify Protocol I was the subject of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution (44/104) in 1989. The resolution
identified France's failure to ratify Protocol I as an obstacle to the treaty's
success.
20 France signed Protocol I in 1979, but has failed to ratify it.
Thus, the government of France has not pledged to militarily denuclearize
its holdings in French Guiana, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. France argues
that those Caribbean entities are integral parts of the metropole and that it
has the prerogative to establish nuclear devices on French territory if it so
wishes.21
There are 33 independent nations in Latin America. The basic treaty
has been signed by twenty-six Latin American nations, leaving only seven
nations that have not signed it. These seven nations are Cuba, Belize,
Guyana, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, and the Grenadines.
Cuba refuses to sign the treaty because of its strained relations with the
United States and the presence of the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo
19
R. Jeffrey Smith, "President Orders Sweeping Reductions in Strategic
and Tactical Nuclear Arms," The Washington Post (28 September 1991), Al.
.
20 UN Disarmament Yearbook (Volume 14, 1989), 193.
21 Atkins, Latin America, 338.
14
Bay. Cuba does not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. 22 The
four island nations of Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, and the
Grenadines are still considering the treaty. None of these nations has any
nuclear energy ambitions.
Belize and Guyana are prevented from signing the treaty because of
territorial disputes with their neighbors. Neither nation is able to build
nuclear weapons. The treaty language prevents Belize and Guyana from
joining the treaty until their territorial disputes dating back to the colonial
rule are resolved. Negotiations are in progress between Belize and
Guatemala over their disputed territory. Similar talks are underway
between Guyana and Venezuela over the Essequibo River dispute.23 The
completion of these negotiations may lead to the inclusion of Belize and
Guyana in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Out of twenty-six Latin American nations that have signed the
treaty, only eighteen nations have completed safeguards negotiations with
the IAEA. Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco placed time limitations for
the completion of negotiations with the IAEA.
Art. 13. Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting
22 Chapter V of this thesis addresses Cuban nuclear capabilities.
23 Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America (New York:
Praeger, 1984.), 159.
15
Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the
date of deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These
agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen
months after the date of initiation of such negotiations except in case of
unforeseen circumstances or force majeure.24
The time requirements specified in Article 13 appear to have been
unrealistic because of the long delay in completing negotiations with the
IAEA. The eighteen signatories with active IAEA safeguard agreements are:
Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 25 The following
tables present data on the participation of Latin American nations in two
important nuclear proliferation treaties. Table II presents the status of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. Table III lists the Latin American nations subscribing
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT is not specifically
addressed in this thesis, but a great degree of overlap exists between the
goals of the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
24 Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of the UN Agreements, 804.
25 Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger
Publishing Co., 1988), 466.
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rable II
status of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
Year of Year of IAEA
Signature Ratification Safeguards
Argentina 1967 — Partial
Antigua 1983 1983 No
Bahamas 1967 1976 No
Barbados 1968 1969 Yes
Belize -- -- --
Bolivia 1967 1969 Yes
Brazil 1967 1968* Partial
Chile 1967 1974* Yes
Colombia 1967 1972 Yes
Costa Rica 1967 1969 Yes
Cuba -- -- --
Dominica -- -- --
Dominican Republic 1967 1968 Yes
Ecuador 1967 1969 Yes
El Salvador 1967 1968 Yes
Grenada 1975 1975 No
Grenadines -- -- --
Guatemala 1967 1970 Yes
Guyana -- -- --
Haiti 1967 1969 No
Honduras 1967 1968 Yes
Jamaica 1967 1969 Yes
Mexico 1967 1967 Yes
Nicaragua 1967 1968 Yes
Panama 1967 1971 Yes
Paraguay 1967 1969 Yes
Peru 1967 1969 Yes
St. Christopher -- -- --
St. Lucia -- -- --
Suriname 1976 1977 Yes
Trinidad/ Tobago 1967 1975 No
Uruguay 1967 1968 Yes
Venezuela 1967 1970 Yes
-- Treaty not signed and/or ratified
* Entry-into-force provision has not been waived •
Source: Leonard S . Spector, Nuclear Ambitions
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** Nations that have neither
signed nor ratified the Treaty.
Source: Joseph F. Pilat, Bevond
1995: The Future of the NPT Regime
(New York: Plenum Press, 1990),
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Argentina is the only signatory of the Treaty of Tlatelolco that has
not ratified the treaty because of issues of "national sovereignty and
independence."26 Argentina opposes any international inspections of its
nuclear program. During treaty negotiations, Argentina wanted its right to
develop "peaceful nuclear explosives" (PNEs) protected by the treaty.
Argentina believed it had the sovereign right under Article 18 to
"carry out [nuclear] explosions for peaceful purposes." However, virtually all
other parties to the treaty accepted the U.S. and Soviet position that all
nuclear explosives have military applications and should be forbidden under
the treaty. The U.S.-Soviet interpretation is based on Article 5 of the Treaty
that outlaws all nuclear explosives "that are appropriate for warlike
purposes."27 Some proliferation experts assume that Argentina's position
on "peaceful nuclear explosives" was an effort to legitimize its efforts to
build a nuclear warhead.
Brazil and Chile responded to the Argentine refusal to ratify the
treaty by refusing to waive the entry into force provision. However, Chile
(unlike Brazil) allows IAEA inspections at all of its nuclear facilities. Until
recently, Argentina and Brazil were unwilling to renounce nuclear
26 Richard Kessler, "Peronists seek "Nuclear Greatness," The Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists (Volume 45, Number 4, May 1989), 13.
27 Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990),
431.
19
explosions and refused to accept "full-scope" IAEA safeguards. This has
been the primary stumbling block preventing the completion of the Treaty
of Tlatelolco. Brazil and Argentina do not allow IAEA inspections at certain
nuclear facilities developed with "indigenous" technology. An end to the
nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil is essential before "full-scope"
IAEA safeguards can be established.
This thesis is devoted to examining the important role of nuclear
rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil in fulfilling the objectives of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Chile has expressed the desire to waive the entry
into force provision, if Argentina ratified the treaty. Cuba would then be the
sole Latin American nation with a nuclear energy program not subscribing
to the treaty. This would further isolate Cuba from its Latin American
neighbors, possibly providing the leverage necessary to encourage Cuba to
sign and ratify the treaty. Therefore, the nuclear rapprochement between
Argentina and Brazil is the most important step in ending the threat of
nuclear proliferation in Latin America. The next section of this thesis
examines the requirements for building nuclear weapons.
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III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION
REQUIREMENTS
Argentina and Brazil will be capable of producing nuclear weapons
before the end of the decade.28 This capability is the result of decades of
research and investment. This chapter presents the essential "shopping list"
for building an atomic weapon. A later chapter measures the progress
achieved by Argentina and Brazil in accumulating these ingredients.
The construction of an atomic weapon is expensive because it requires
advanced technologies and specialized facilities. The most challenging task
in making the bomb is producing fissile material. 29 Fissile material is
either plutonium or highly enriched uranium that makes up the central core
of a nuclear device. Plutonium or enriched uranium is required to produce
the self-sustaining chain reaction called fission. Nuclear fission is the
splitting of the uranium isotope (U235 ) or the plutonium isotope (P239 ) which
produces tremendous amounts of energy.30
28 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 221.
29 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq and the Bomb," The Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists (Volume 47, Number 2, March 1991), 17.
30 Advanced nuclear weapons (also called thermonuclear devices) result
from nuclear fusion where light isotopes of hydrogen are joined at high
temperatures to produce greater energy than is possible by nuclear fission.
Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, U.S. Nuclear
Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1984), Chapter 2.
21
The IAEA considers the following quantities of nuclear material to be
significant: eight kilograms of plutonium or twenty-five kilograms of
weapons-grade uranium. Either amount is enough to build one simple
nuclear device.31 However, smaller quantities of plutonium or enriched
uranium could be enough to make an atomic warhead using advanced
theoretical computations and high-grade materials.32
Once fissile material is available, the production of an atomic bomb
requires the following capabilities, according to David Albright and Mark
Hibbs:
- Tamper or reflector to surround the fissile material, holding it together
while fission occurs and reflecting neutrons to speed the fission process.
- High explosives in the form of shaped charges to compress the tamper
and fissile material creating the critical mass necessary for fission.
- Fuzing system capable of timing the explosion of the shaped charges
within a fraction of a microsecond.
- Theoretical calculations to design the physical properties of the bomb
and to predict the yield of the weapon. Supercomputers are not necessary
for these calculations, but are helpful.
- Implosion package testing using flash X-ray machines and high speed
cameras to determine the compression achieved in the nuclear core.
- Weaponization or the ability to deliver the bomb or warhead by aircraft
or missile.33
31 The IAEA's definition of significant amounts of fissile material is
explained in Leonard Weiss, "Tighten Up On Nuclear Cheaters," The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists (Volume 47, Number 4, May 1991), 12.
32 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 417.
33 Albright and Hibbs, "Iraq and the Bomb," 18.
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Despite the complexity of the tasks identified by Albright and Hibbs,
the most difficult part in building an atomic weapon is the production of
fissile material. The manufacturing of atomic weapons is relatively easy to
accomplish in comparison to the production of fissile material. Uranium U23 "
and plutonium P239 require highly complex and expensive production
facilities.
A. THE URANIUM ENRICHMENT METHOD OF PRODUCING
FISSILE MATERIAL
The uranium enrichment process begins with natural uranium that
contains only 0.7% of U235 isotope. The percentage of U23° may be increased
by methods such as gaseous diffusion, jet nozzle, ultracentrifuge or even
laser technologies. An atomic bomb requires enriched uranium with a very
high percentage of U235
,
normally over 90% to become weapons-grade. It is
possible to produce a bomb with uranium enriched to as low as only 20%
tj235 rpj^ vo iume f low-enriched uranium needed to make such a bomb
would be impractical. 34 Table IV lists the various grades of enriched
uranium and their uses for nuclear energy or atomic weapons.
34 An explanation of the uranium enrichment process can be found in David
Albright, "Bomb Potential for South America," The Bulletin of Atomic





Natural - contains about 0.7% of the fissile isotope U235 ; used in
reactors moderated with heavy water or graphite.
Slightly enriched - up to about 5% U235 ; used in conventional
nuclear reactors moderated with ordinary water.
Low-enriched - up to 20% U235 ; used in many research reactors.
Medium-enriched - between 20% and 50% U235
;
potentially usable
for nuclear weapons, but in very large quantities.
Highly-enriched - above 50% U235 ; begins to become useful for
nuclear weapons and naval propulsion reactors.
Weapons-grade - above 90% U235 ; used in nuclear weapons, research
reactors and most naval propulsion reactors.
Source: David Albright, "Bomb Potential for South America," The
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Volume 45, Number 4, May 1989), 16.
The uranium enrichment process involves many steps.35 The IAEA
and the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines (NSG) attempt to safeguard uranium
enrichment technologies. The IAEA and NSG efforts make the clandestine
procurement of nuclear technologies difficult, but not impossible for
35 Detailed information on the uranium enrichment process can be found
in Harvey W. Graves, Jr., Nuclear Fuel Management (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1979), Chapter 2.
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ambitious nations.36 Argentina and Brazil invested in uranium enrichment
facilities to achieve an independent nuclear fuel cycle and to become nuclear
exporters. Enrichment technologies are necessary to achieve an independent
nuclear fuel cycle capability. Both nations wanted the ability to
manufacture enriched nuclear fuel using their ample supplies of natural
uranium. Sara Tanis and Bennett Ramberg describe uranium enrichment
technology as an important step towards "nuclear autarky," whereby
Argentina and Brazil could minimize foreign leverage over their nuclear
industries. 37 Figure 1 presents a flow chart of these steps in the
enrichment process.
36 Zachary S. Davis, "Non-Proliferation Regimes: A Comparative Analysis,"
CRS Report for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1 April
1991), 3-17.
37 Sara Tanis and Bennett Ramberg, "Argentina," in William C. Potter, Ed.,
International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenge of the
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Enriched Uranium Production Process
The second reason for Argentina and Brazil to invest in uranium
enrichment technologies was to become nuclear exporters. During the late
1970s, nuclear power was expected to rival petroleum as the world's most
important energy source. Fear of the growing power of OPEC influenced the
United States to plan to build over 230 nuclear reactors to reduce U.S.
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dependence on oil.38 The U.S. did not complete all of these planned
reactors because of domestic opposition, relatively low oil prices, and the
declining power of OPEC during the 1980s. However, Argentina and Brazil
made investments in uranium enrichment facilities when nuclear fuel
exports were expected to become lucrative. Brazilian Minister of Mines and
Energy, Caesar Cals, made the following statement in 1976: "countries with
an effective capacity to exploit and enrich uranium will have more strength
in the world than the present oil producers."39
The demand for nuclear power has not expanded as predicted during
the 1970s when emerging nuclear-supplier states (such as Argentina and
Brazil) made their investment decisions in nuclear infrastructure. The need
to justify past investments will cause increased competition for nuclear
exports that could lead to increased unsafeguarded nuclear transfers.
Nuclear fuel exports provide Argentina and Brazil with hard currency
needed for their economies. Former Brazilian President Jose Sarney of
Brazil underscored the importance of nuclear exports (especially enriched
uranium fuels) in the following statement made in September 1987:
In the future as today, nuclear energy will constitute one of the major
markets in the industrialized world. We should prepare for that future,
38 Antony V. Nero, Jr., A Guidebook to Nuclear Reactors (Los Angeles,
University of California Press, 1979), 22.
39 Caesar Cals cited in Etal Solingen, "Brazil: Technology, Countertrade,
and Nuclear Exports," in Potter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade, 116.
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in order to share in it, by developing technology, producing reactors, and
selling fuel.
40
Another reason for investments in uranium enrichment technology
was the production of weapons-grade fissile material. Highly-enriched
uranium can be used for research reactors, nuclear submarine propulsion or
an atomic bomb. Argentina and Brazil built clandestine enrichment
facilities. The pursuit of an autonomous nuclear fuel cycle and the
development of a nuclear export potential would not have required the
degree of secrecy surrounding some of the enrichment facilities in both
nations. According to the Aspen Strategy Group, Argentina and Brazil built
secret facilities for military production of nuclear materials. These facilities
were designed, constructed, and maintained without IAEA safeguards.41
Leonard Spector concluded that the clandestine enrichment facilities
were intended to build a nuclear weapon because:
...it seems highly unlikely that Brazil [or Argentina] would have gone
though these lengths simply to obtain research reactor fuel or to
improve its maritime capabilities in the next century.42
Chapter V of this thesis addresses the specifics of the Argentine and
Brazilian nuclear weapons research programs. Now we turn to the second
40
Potter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade, 111 (emphasis added).
41 Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats. 12.
42 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,"
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 41.
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method of producing weapons-grade fissile material - the plutonium
extraction process.
B. THE PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION METHOD OF PRODUCING
FISSILE MATERIAL
A nation needs to have a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium. As
the reactor operates, the uranium fuel is transformed into plutonium and
highly toxic wastes. The irradiated or "spent" fuel from the reactor can be
chemically treated to separate plutonium from the radioactive waste.
Specialized facilities called reprocessing plants must be constructed to
handle the highly radioactive spent fuel. The plants have thick walls, lead
shielding, special ventilation and robotics to prevent radiation hazards.
Plutonium mixed with uranium can be used as a fuel in some nuclear
power reactors called breeder reactors.43 Many nations during the 1970s
believed that as uranium became scarce, plutonium might become an
important alternative fuel for nuclear power plants. Worldwide uranium
resources, however, have not become as scarce as predicted. Argentina and
Brazil have continued to find increased quantities of uranium ore. Brazil
has assured uranium reserves exceeding 190,000 metric tons and Argentina
has about 12,000 metric tons. 44 The availability of uranium combined with
43 Breeder reactors are considered a dangerous proliferation threat because
they produce or "breed" larger quantities of plutonium than are initially used
to fuel the reactor.
44 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 238, 260.
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the complexity of reprocessing plutonium influenced both nations to slow
their development of plutonium extraction facilities. Figure 2 shows the
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It appears that the preferred method of nuclear proliferation in
Argentina and Brazil during the 1980s was by the uranium enrichment
route, not the plutonium path. According to the Aspen Strategy Group,
Argentina and Brazil were discouraged from plutonium reprocessing
because it was more expensive than uranium enrichment. Uranium
enrichment plants have a greater export potential than plutonium
reprocessing facilities.45 The next chapter of this thesis examines
international efforts of the IAEA to prevent nuclear proliferation.
45 Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 3.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
The destructive capacity of the atomic bomb shocked the world
following the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Manhattan Project
succeeded in building Albert Einstein's vision of "extremely powerful bombs
of a new type."46 In 1946, the U.S. proposed the Baruch Plan to take the
dangerous aspects of atomic energy out of national hands and place it in the
international hands of the United Nations. This effort to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons was unsuccessful because the Soviet Union
rejected the Baruch Plan.
Nuclear competition between the superpowers has remained a central
feature of international relations. The failure of the Baruch Plan caused
President Eisenhower to propose his "Atomic Power for Peace" program in a
speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December
1953. President Eisenhower called for the creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the United Nations. The IAEA would
ensure that all fissile material was used "to serve the peaceful pursuits of
46 From Albert Einstein's letter to President Franklin Roosevelt on 2
August 1939. See Archelaus R. Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards
Experience," in Lewis A. Dunn, Ed., Arms Control Verification & the New Role
of On-Site Inspections (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 39.
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mankind." This proposal became known as "Atoms for Peace." The IAEA
was created after lengthy negotiations on 29 July 1957.47
The introduction of nuclear power plants in Latin America began
during the 1950s with the building of research reactors in Argentina and
Brazil. The United States "Atoms for Peace" program encouraged the
development of nuclear energy around the globe. The "Atoms for Peace"
could be called a major U.S. foreign policy mistake from a proliferation
standpoint. Despite being based on good intentions, this program provided
the technological basis that has actually fostered greater proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
A. HISTORY OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS
The IAEA was given a dual mandate: to facilitate the peaceful use of
nuclear energy and to prevent the misuse of nuclear materials or facilities
for military purposes. The Statute of the IAEA explains this dual mandate:
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world...It
shall establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure fissionable
materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made
available by the Agency or under its supervision or control are not used
in such a way as to further any military purpose.48
47
Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 40.
48 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna: IAEA, 1980).
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The objective of the IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of any
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The IAEA hopes to
deter any such diversion by creating the risk of early detection.49 The
safeguard procedures of the IAEA require a system of strict accounting of
fissile material and control over certain nuclear technologies like
reprocessing or enrichment facilities. 50 The safeguards agreements are the
result of negotiations between the IAEA and individual countries.
Unfortunately, the IAEA negotiations normally do not achieve their stated
objectives in the safeguards agreement. If a nation does not declare a
laboratory conducting nuclear weapons research to be part of the safeguards
agreement, then the facility is not subject to IAEA safeguards.51
There are three different types of safeguards agreements used by the
IAEA to negotiate with a host nation. The first type of safeguards
agreement, created in 1961, pertained only to nuclear reactors up to 100
megawatts. In 1965, the IAEA Information Circular 66 (INFCIRC/66)
established safeguards for nuclear facilities of all sizes and types.52
However, INFCIRC/66 safeguards apply only to specific facilities identified
by the host nation for IAEA inspections. INFCIRC/66 establishes only
49 Weiss, "Tighten Up On Nuclear Cheaters," 11-12.
50 The shortcomings of the IAEA are discussed in "Clouseau in Iraq," The
Wall Street Journal (12 August 1991), A10.
51 Weiss, "Tighten Up On Nuclear Cheaters," 12.
52 Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 44.
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partial IAEA safeguards. It allows a nation to prevent IAEA inspections at
any number of undisclosed nuclear facilities not covered in the agreement.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco requires safeguards agreements based on
INFCIRC/66. Argentina and Brazil have safeguards agreements with the
IAEA based on INFCIRC/66 that allows certain nuclear facilities to be
exempt from IAEA inspections.
In 1971, IAEA Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153) established a
third agreement that requires full-scope safeguards of all nuclear
facilities in a nation.53 The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) required the full-scope safeguards based upon INFCIRC/153
for of all its signatories. Argentina and Brazil have not signed the NPT and
have refused full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA because they
believe them to be an infringement on their sovereignty. Full-scope
safeguards require all nuclear facilities to be open to IAEA inspectors.
B. STRENGTHS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS
The strengths of the IAEA in preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons result from the following technical considerations. First, fissile
material is valuable and dangerous requiring detailed records and physical
security. The IAEA is capable of accounting for this material by examining
these records regularly. The IAEA uses security measures such as on-site
inspections, cameras, and tamper-proof seals to deter any diversion of fissile
53 Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 43.
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material. Inspectors can use gamma ray spectrometers to detect any
radioactive fissile material. Second, most nuclear fuel remains in a reactor
for several years simplifying the IAEA accounting procedures.54 Third, the
IAEA adopts a competitive strategy of developing safeguards that try to
stay one step ahead of emerging nuclear technologies. Finally, the IAEA can
call international attention to the misdeeds of any country violating its
safeguards. The IAEA informs the United Nations Security Council and the
General Assembly of any violations it encounters.55
IAEA safeguards have gained international acceptance since the
agency's creation in 1957. In 1962, the United States gave the IAEA the
responsibility for safeguarding most U.S. nuclear transactions. This action
increased the prestige of the IAEA.56
In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco designated IAEA safeguards to be
the cornerstone of its nonproliferation efforts. Similarly, the NPT gave the
IAEA a major safeguards role in 1970. These two international treaties
required IAEA safeguards. This boosted the credibility of the IAEA. The
full-scope safeguards established by INFCIRC/153 became a requirement for
54 Some nuclear reactors have an on-line refueling capability that permits
the removal of irradiated fuels without an extensive shutdown period. These
type of reactors require additional safeguards because of the opportunity to
divert spent fuels to a plutonium reprocessing plant.
65 Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 44.
66 One exception was made by the U.S. for the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) that maintained its own safeguards responsibility.
See Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 43.
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the NPT in 1971. 57 The non-proliferation mission of the IAEA was further
enhanced in 1974 when a group of seven nuclear exporting nations
established export controls.
The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines (NSG) established by the Zangger
Committee in 1974 and the London Club in 1975 complemented IAEA
safeguards. The NSG maintains "trigger lists" of sensitive nuclear
technologies that if exported would require the application of IAEA
safeguards. The NSG enhanced the prestige of the IAEA.58 Lewis Dunn
stated that "nuclear export controls and supplier restraint have significantly
complicated, slowed, or increased costs of efforts by problem countries to
acquire nuclear weapons."59 The limits of export controls must be
acknowledged. Some nations have found ways to circumvent export controls.
Not all nations follow the NSG guidelines with the same level of
commitment. Lucrative nuclear exports can be a strong incentive to ignore
London Club guidelines.
C. WEAKNESSES OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS
The weaknesses of IAEA safeguards result primarily because the
IAEA needs to have the cooperation of the host nation. If the host nations
57 Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 43.
58 A more complete description of the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines can be
found in Zachary S. Davis, "Non-Proliferation Regimes," CRS Report for
Congress, 10.
59 Dunn, "Four Decades of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, " in Aspen Strategy
Group Report, New Threats, 238.
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desires to deceive or keep information hidden from the IAEA, it will most
likely be successful. Archelaus R. Turrentine, former Assistant Director at
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated that the IAEA
inspects only declared nuclear facilities and does not try to uncover secret
facilities.
60
It is difficult for the IAEA to force a nation to reveal deeply
held secrets regarding nuclear weapons research.
Hans M. Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, explains the difficulty in preventing the nuclear proliferation.
Despite the collective global interest in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons, some nations will act with a Hobbesian self interest.
Nations do not normally undertake or refrain from actions because of
such collective interest; they do so because of their individual
interests...A nation perceiving that it has a real interest in developing
nuclear weapons is not likely to refrain from doing so merely because it
is told such development would be bad for the world community. 61
The IAEA also encounters political and financial difficulties because
of its dual mandate. The IAEA funded through the United Nations. The
IAEA budget is divided between nuclear energy development programs and
the maintenance of safeguards. Hans Blix, like all past IAEA Director
Generals, faces political pressure from nations desiring IAEA help in
60
Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 50.
61 Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, Beyond 1995: The Future of the
NPT Regime (New York: Plenum Press, 1990), ix.
38
developing their nuclear programs. Many nations want to see greater
resources devoted to building nuclear power plants, rather than being
"wasted" on safeguards. The 1988 budget of the IAEA was $155 million with
about $63 million dedicated to the Department of Safeguards. 62 Most of the
safeguards budget is spent on safeguards in nations not considered to be a
nuclear weapons proliferation threat. While nations posing the greatest
threat to nuclear proliferation are often not being inspected at all by the
IAEA. 63
A third area of weakness for IAEA safeguards results from the
overlap in utility of nuclear facilities for both peaceful and military
applications. The IAEA must schedule its inspections in advance, allowing
any discrepancies to be hidden. For example, a gaseous diffusion enrichment
facility (like the Pilcaniyeu plant in Argentina) can produce 20% enriched
uranium for peaceful and military purposes. Increased enrichment levels
can be accomplished in the same facility through two methods called
stretching and recycling.™ It is difficult for IAEA to monitor such a facility,
especially when improper activities can be stopped before the regularly
62 Turrentine, "Lessons of the IAEA Safeguards," 42.
63 The emerging nuclear weapons nations are Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Taiwan.
64 For detailed information on stretching and recycling in Argentina and
Brazil see Albright, "Bomb Potential for South America," 17-18.
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scheduled visits by the IAEA. The host nation can plan to produce only 20%
enriched uranium during IAEA scheduled visits.
The predictability of inspections is a major deficiency of the current
IAEA safeguards. The advanced warning of upcoming IAEA inspections
allows time to correct any safeguards violations. Safeguards could be
strengthened by random inspections. Nations with suspected of nuclear
weapons research could be targeted with frequent inspections.
The failure of the IAEA to detect Iraq's efforts to build an atomic
bomb became evident in 1991. Iraq has allowed IAEA safeguards for the
past two decades. The IAEA inspectors, however, did not discover the Iraqi
diversion of fissile material. This failure tarnished the IAEA's reputation.
The bad publicity for the IAEA may eventually make safeguards stronger
because the lessons learned in Iraq will encourage the establishment of
random on-site inspections. 65
In summary, IAEA inspectors regularly visit nearly 900 nuclear
facilities in over 50 countries. Their safeguards assure that nuclear
materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The IAEA has a
membership of 110 nations and has been conducting inspections for over 25
years.
66 The failure to stop Iraq's secret diversion of fissile material was a
65 John Simpson, "NPT Stronger After Iraq," The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists (Volume 47, Number 8, October 1991), 12-13.
66 Davis, "Non-Proliferation Regimes," CRS Report for Congress, 8.
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blow to IAEA prestige, but should encourage increased funding for the IAEA
in the long run. Despite its shortcomings, the IAEA is the best method of
controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA carries an
international stamp of approval and legitimacy. The next chapter of this
thesis will examine the history of nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil.
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V. HISTORY OF NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
A. LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
Argentina and Brazil are the only nations in Latin America with
large enough nuclear programs to warrant immediate concern for the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 67 The only other Latin American nations
of potential concern for nuclear proliferation are Cuba and Chile. Mexico
and Venezuela have only small investments in nuclear power, largely
because of the size of their domestic oil reserves. Peru has a small nuclear
energy program and has expressed interest in trying to build a pilot-scale
fuel-fabrication plant in the Chapi region. Peru's financial and political
problems, however, preclude the Fujimori government from making the
necessary investments for nuclear weapons research. 68 Ecuador signed a
nuclear agreement with Brazil to begin the supply of technology and
expertise for the construction of a nuclear research reactor. Ecuador's
67 William C. Potter, Director of the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project at
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, publishes a quarterly review
on the global nuclear trade called Eye on Supply (Monterey, CA: ENSP, 1991).
Argentine and Brazil are the only Latin American nations defined to be
"emerging nuclear suppliers" capable of exporting nuclear technology.
68 Eve on Supply (Number 1, Summer 1990), 8.
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nuclear program is in its infant stages, it lacks the resources and political
will to grow to any size comparable with the programs of Cuba or Chile. 69
Cuba is constructing two nuclear power reactors in Cienfuegos with
Soviet assistance. These plants are under full-scope IAEA safeguards. In
addition, nuclear experts from the United States have inspected safety
precautions at Cuba's nuclear construction sites. Following the Soviet
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986, the United States received details of
the safety features at the Cuban nuclear plants from both Cuba and the
Soviet Union. 70 In 1989, officials from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) toured the construction site of the Cuban power plants.
The NCR concluded that Cuba did not pose a nuclear proliferation
threat. 71
Chile has had a modest nuclear research program since 1964;
however, its entire program is also under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Chile
was concerned by nuclear weapons research occurring in Argentina, but did
not responded by trying to build its own atomic bomb. Instead, Chile has
attracted international attention to their strict adherence to the IAEA
69 Eye on Supply (Number 5, Fall 1991), 7.
70 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 386.
71 Joseph B. Treaster, "U.S-Cuban Enmity May Be Relaxing," The New
York Times (6 January 1989), A6.
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safeguards.72 Nuclear proliferation experts agree that Chile is not pursuing
nuclear weapons and that the size of its nuclear infrastructure could not
support an atomic weapons development program. Leonard Spector claims
that Chile's "rudimentary nuclear research program is not of proliferation
"73
concern.
Before addressing the nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil, the
reasons for a nation would pursue nuclear weapons should be listed. Table
V presents the basic reasons for a nation to desire nuclear weapons.
Table V
Benefits of Pursuing/Having Nuclear Weapons
a. Deter attack and/or intimidate adversaries.
b. Win international prestige.
c. Satisfy desires of within the military that want nuclear
weapons.
d. Establish a self-sufficient arms industry &
modern technology base.
The pursuit of nuclear weapons is not cost-free. Nations pursue
nuclear weapons research in secrecy because of the potential international
72 Joe Goldman, "Chile Takes the Open Road," The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Volume 46, Number 7, September 1990), 7-8.
73 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 386.
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and domestic backlash against such a decision to build atomic weapons. The
last nation to "declare" its possession of nuclear weapons was China in
1964. Since then, Israel, India, South Africa and Pakistan have obtained the
capability to build an atomic bomb. These governments have refrained from
"declaring" their nuclear capabilities because of a fear being ostracized by
the international community and their own populations. Table VI presents a
simplified list of the reasons why a nation would not want to develop
nuclear weapons.
Table VI
Costs of Pursuing/Having Nuclear Weapons
a. Incur the wrath of the international community, resulting in
trade sanctions and reduced access to important technology.
b. Destabilize balance of power in region.
c. Obligate scarce funds to a project with little economic return.
d. Reduce military readiness by consuming a large percentage of
the defense budget.
B. ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
The Argentine nuclear program is the oldest and most sophisticated
in Latin America. It began during the late 1940s, when President Juan
Peron welcomed German scientists that emigrated to Argentina following
World War II. Some of these scientists had taken part in the nuclear fission
45
program in Nazi Germany. 74 In 1949, a laboratory at San Carlos de
Bariloche in Patagonia began atomic research. The Argentine government
established the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) in 1950 to
direct the nation's nuclear programs. Argentina's tradition of excellence in
education75 and close ties with the European scientific community provided
an outstanding foundation to build a successful nuclear research program.
The goal of nuclear autonomy has always been a high priority of the
CNEA. The announced goals of CNEA priorities were the constructing of
nuclear power plants, achieving a self-sufficient nuclear fuel cycle, and
building of an export industry. The development of a nuclear weapons
appears to have been a silent goal. The CNEA built a plutonium
reprocessing plant at Ezeiza and a clandestine uranium enrichment plant at
Pilcaniyeu. Both of these facilities are free from IAEA safeguards. The
CNEA leadership has been dominated by military officers. The large degree
of military involvement in the CNEA made the diversion of resources to
weapons research possible.
74 Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S. Davis, "Argentina, Brazil, and
Nuclear Proliferation," CRS Report for Congress (Washington: Congressional
Research Service, August 1991), 2.
75 Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Argentina's first civilian president from
1868 to 1874, expressed the desire to modernize his nation and was a strong
proponent of public education. See Jose Enrique Rodo, Ariel (Austin, TX:
University of Texas, 1988), 112.
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Argentine military tried to obtain nuclear weapons through
indigenous development and covert efforts to purchase a weapon from
abroad. The 1991 investigation into the international banking scandal of the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) alleged that former
Argentine president, General Leopoldo Galtieri, negotiated with the bank to
buy a nuclear weapon (from an unknown source) in the early 1980s. The
investigation concluded, however, that Galtieri was unable to purchase any
nuclear weapons.76
The success of the Argentine nuclear program has been a source of
national pride (as well as military ambition). The following statement by
Manuel Mondino, President of CNEA, exemplifies this pride:
Argentina is one of only ten countries that managed to control the
uranium enrichment process to use nuclear energy. The country is
therefore in the First World. 77
The Argentine nuclear program is the most independent in Latin
America because of its indigenous technical capabilities. Argentina complete
its first research reactor (RA-1 at Constituyentes) in 1958. The RA-1 reactor
76
"Alleged Purchase of Nuclear Weapons," (in Spanish), NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS, 26 July 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-145, 29 July 1991), 29.
77
"Argentine Foreign Minister Di Telia's Address to the U.N. General
Assembly," (in Spanish), NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS , 23 September 1991,
translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-
91-185, 24 September 1991), 11.
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was built with Argentine technology. CNEA allowed IAEA inspectors to
examine the facility. A second research reactor (RA-0 at Cordoba) began
operations in 1965. This reactor, also built without external assistance, has
never been subject to IAEA safeguards.78 Nuclear construction continued
during the late 1960s with the completion of two more research reactors and
a laboratory-scale plutonium extraction plant at Ezeiza. The Ezeiza
reprocessing plant operated without IAEA safeguards from 1969 until 1973
when it was dismantled.
The first nuclear power reactor, Atucha I, began operation in 1974.
Siemens A.G. of West Germany build Atucha I and required IAEA
safeguards. Brazilian officials were suspicious (and jealous) of the Argentine
progress. Brazil did not have an operational power reactor until 1982. In
1983, the second Argentine nuclear power plant came on-line at Embalse.
Technical problems at both the Atucha I and Embalse reactors have forced
them to shut down on several occasions. 79 A third power reactor called
Atucha II is scheduled for completion in 1993, but is encountering severe
financial difficulties. This completion date is uncertain because CNEA must
78 Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 251, 277.
79 The environmental organization, Greenpeace, issued a report in April
1991 claiming that major safety violations existed at the Atucha I power plant.
CNEA denied these allegations. See Daniel E. Arias, "Could Atucha Explode?"
(in Spanish), CLARIN, 21 April 1991, translated and reported by INFO-
SOUTH (24 May 1991).
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invest at least $70 million to complete Atucha II during a period of budget
cutbacks.80
In 1978, Argentina began building a production-sized plutonium
extraction plant at Ezeiza. CNEA applied the lessons learned at the
laboratory-scale reprocessing plant to this larger project at this same
location. Argentine officials agree to partial IAEA safeguards at this facility.
Argentina demanded the freedom to produce plutonium without IAEA
supervision when reprocessing the spent fuel of its unsafeguarded research
reactors.
81
The rated capability of the Ezeiza reprocessing plant is 15 kilograms
of plutonium per year. The Ezeiza reprocessing plant began operational
tests in 1989 and may have provided Argentina weapons-grade plutonium.
President Menem, however, indefinitely suspended the Ezeiza reprocessing
project in 1990.82 Argentina had poor results with plutonium reprocessing
because the process proved to be too expensive. In contrast, Argentina's
uranium enrichment program has been very successful.
In 1978, the clandestine construction of Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant
began. The existence of this enrichment plant stayed secret for five years. It
80 Elonora Gosman, "Nuclear Priorities," (in Spanish), CLARIN, 27 May
1990. translated and reported in INFO-SOUTH (28 June 1991).
81 Robert Laufer, "Argentina Looks to Reprocessing to Fill Its Own Needs
Plus Plutonium Sales," Nuclear Fuel (8 November 1982), 3.
82
"Argentina Announces Delay of Controversial Plant," Nuclear News
(March 1990), 70.
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was not until October 1983, one week before the inauguration of President-
elect Raul Alfonsin, that CNEA revealed the Pilcaniyeu plant to the
Argentine public. Alfonsin claims he did not know anything about this
enrichment plant during his entire presidential campaign. An interview
between Leonard Spector and Alfonsin in June 1990, shows that Alfonsin
was "taken by surprise when the existence of the plant was announced just
prior" to his inauguration. 83
The secrecy surrounding this enrichment facility raised suspicions
that Argentine intended to build an atomic bomb. None of Argentina's
power reactors (existing or planned) require enriched uranium. Only
Argentine research reactors use small amounts of enriched uranium fuel.
Table VII is a list of Argentina's current nuclear facilities.




Two operational power reactors
Atucha I (Heavy-water, 320 MWe, German supplier)
Embalse (Heavy-water, 600 MWe, Canadian supplier)
One power reactor under construction
Atucha II (Heavy-water, 745 MWe, German supplier)
Completion goal 1993
Seven research reactors [3 without IAEA safeguards]
One uranium enrichment plant
Pilcaniyeu [no IAEA safeguards]
(500 kg of 20% enriched uranium per year)
One plutonium extraction plant
Ezeiza [partial IAEA safeguards]
(15 kg of plutonium per year)
11,900 metric tons assured uranium reserves
Source: Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 238-240.
In November 1983, Alfonsin became president after seven years of
military rule. He replaced the head of the Argentine Nuclear Energy
Commission (CNEA) Admiral Carlos Castro Madero with a civilian, Alberto
Costantini. Alfonsin was embarrassed by the surprise announcement of the
Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant and he wanted to place the CNEA under
civilian control. This was the first of many steps to reverse the efforts of
Argentine military to produce a nuclear weapon.
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Argentina invested in its nuclear program since the early 1950s.
Argentina had advanced indigenous nuclear capabilities while Brazil was
almost completely dependent on U.S.-supplied technology. A paranoid
competition in nuclear technology ensued between Argentina and Brazil
during the late 1970s.
The nuclear rivalry intensified because of the political power of the
military in each nations. Military governments conducted most nuclear
research in secrecy. This veil of secrecy caused great suspicions, possibly
greater suspicion than the actual progress of either nation's nuclear
weapons programs would have otherwise warranted. The investments in
nuclear weapons research continued in both nations during the 1980s.
Brazil made considerable progress in matching the nuclear technology
breakthroughs of its neighbor.
C. BRAZILS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
The first nuclear concerns of Brazil began in the early 1950s when
Brazil asked an unresponsive United States to share nuclear technology
with Brazil in return for uranium exports. 84 In 1956, the Brazilian
government established the National Committee for Nuclear Energy
(CNEN) and the Institute of Atomic Energy (EPEN). These agencies believed
that Brazil's economic growth required nuclear power. The mission assigned
to CNEN and IPEN was to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities.
84 Solingen, "Brazil: Technology, Countertrade, and Nuclear Exports," 114.
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However, the Brazilian scientific infrastructure was not as advanced as in
Argentina and Brazil lacked the close ties with the European scientific
community enjoyed by Argentina.85 Brazil did have a close relationship
with the United States following their cooperative efforts during World War
II. Thus, Brazil became one of the first recipients of U.S. nuclear assistance
under the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" program.
The Brazilian military has nuclear research programs independent of
CNEN. Brazil has an official nuclear program under the state-owned
Brazilian Nuclear Corporation (Nuclebras) and "parallel" nuclear programs
controlled by the Brazilian military. The "parallel" nuclear programs are
also known collectively as the Autonomous Nuclear Technology Program
(PATN) and run by the military-controlled National Nuclear Energy
Commission (CNEN). Within the PATN, the Brazilian army, air force, and
navy each have their own nuclear research program. Nuclear technology
was, however, shared between Nuclebras and the parallel program. The
parallel program is a major proliferation concern because of its secrecy and
use of unsafeguarded facilities.86
Brazil built two nuclear research reactors and one power reactor with
United States assistance under the "Atoms for Peace" program. The
research reactors, IEAR-1 in Sao Paulo and Triga-UMG in Belo Horizonte,
85 Donnelly and Davis, "Argentina, Brazil, and Nuclear Proliferation," 5.
86 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 243.
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became operational in 1957 and 1960 respectively. All nuclear exports from
the United States under the "Atoms for Peace" program required the
supervision of the IAEA. Brazil adopted some of the lessons learned from
IAER-1 and Triga-UMG and built its first indigenous research reactor
(REIN-1 in Rio De Janeiro). REIN-1 started operations in 1965. This
research reactor used medium-enriched uranium supplied by the United
States.87 Since the U.S supplied the nuclear fuel, IAEA safeguards were
required at REIN-1.
The Westinghouse Corporation began the construction of Brazil's first
nuclear power plant in 1971. This deal with a U.S. firm was a subject of
controversy because it did not include any transfer of technology.88 This
reactor used low-enriched uranium fuel. Under the terms of the contract,
Brazil would remain dependent on external sources of enriched uranium
because the U.S. would not transfer any uranium enrichment technology.
This frustrated Brazil's military government and motivated it to seek
nuclear technology from nations other than the United States.
Brazil was slowly developing an indigenous nuclear capability, but,
the Brazilian military wanted faster progress. In 1974, Argentina's Atucha I
power plant started operations and highlighted the gap between Argentine
and Brazilian nuclear programs. Many Brazilians worried that Argentina
87 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 262.
88 Donnelly and Davis, "Argentina, Brazil, and Nuclear Proliferation," 5.
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was obtaining the capability of building nuclear weapons. The Brazilian
military was particularly distressed over the Argentine plutonium
reprocessing plant at Ezeiza.
The construction of Brazil's first nuclear power reactor was a slow
process fraught with cost overruns and delays. The Angra I power plant
began to operate in 1982, but did not begin full commercial operations until
1987 because of technical difficulties.89 The Brazilian disappointment over
the progress of Angra I became part of a growing rift between Brazil and
the United States during the late- 1970s. The Carter administration's
emphasis on human rights soured U.S. relations with the Brazilian military
government. In 1977, Brazil broke its military assistance treaty with the
United States because of President Carter's human rights linkages.
Brazil negotiated with West Germany for access to nuclear
technologies that the U.S. refused to transfer. Brazil wanted uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. In 1975, Nuclebras
completed a mammoth nuclear transfer agreement with West Germany
called the "Deal of the Century." It provided for the sale of eight 1,300-
megawatt nuclear reactors, a pilot-scale plutonium reprocessing plant, and
a commercial-scale uranium enrichment facility.90 The West German
government did not require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for
89
Potter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade, 112.
90
Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 243.
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the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. This allowed Brazil to share
technology between its "parallel" research programs and the state-owned
Nuclebras corporation.
The technology obtained from West Germany allowed the indigenous
nuclear programs of the PATN to advance at a more rapid pace. Brazil
began building two secret uranium enrichment plants in 1983, one at the
Aramar Research Center in Ipero and the other at the IPEN facility in
Sao Paulo. In 1987, Brazil achieved a major breakthrough in centrifuge
enrichment technology at the IPEN facility at the University of Sao Paulo.
This breakthrough ensured Brazil access to weapons-grade uranium during
the 1990s.91
By late 1988, the Ipero enrichment plant had 300 operating
centrifuges. The estimated capacity of this facility could produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for two to three weapons annually. According to a
West German intelligence report, as early as 1987, Brazil had the ability to
produce highly-enriched uranium.92 Brazil circumvented safeguards on
West German technologies in order to use them in the unsafeguarded
parallel program. The West German government protested to Brazil in 1987
that the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was
91 Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 258.
92 Mark Hibbs, "Germans say Brazil Developing Two Production Reactors,"
Nucleonics Week (27 July 1989), 19.
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siphoning off technicians from the safeguarded West German-Brazilian
enrichment program, to work on the parallel program.93
In 1985, financial problems and construction delays forced Brazil to
curtail the purchase of nuclear reactors from West Germany. Brazil
canceled plans to build any new nuclear reactors beyond the two power
plants under construction at the time (Angra II and Angra III). Table VIII
presents Brazil's nuclear facilities.
93 Antonio Rubens Britto de Castro, Noberto Majlis, Luiz Pinguelli Rosa,
and Fernando de Souza Barros, "Brazil's Nuclear Shakeup: Military Still in





One operational power reactor
Angra I (Light-water, 626 MWe, U.S supplier)
Two power reactors under construction
Angra II (Light-water, 1300 MWe, German supplier)
Completion goal 1992
Angra III (Light-water, 1300 MWe, German supplier)
Completion goal 1995
Four research reactors
[One without IAEA safeguards]
Four uranium enrichment plants
[2 without IAEA safeguards]
Aramar Research Center, Ipero
BPEN, Sao Paulo
("several dozen kilograms" of 20% enriched uranium per year)
Two laboratory scale plutonium extraction plants
[1 with partial IAEA safeguards]
IPEN, Sao Paulo (5 kg of plutonium per year)
163,276 metric tons of assured uranium reserves
Source: Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 260-261.
In 1988, Nuclebras was dissolved and state utility, Electrobr&s, took
control of all nuclear power plant operations.94 The 1988 reorganization
was directed by the Sarney administration as a cost cutting measure and as
94
Potter, Ed., International Nuclear Trade, 112.
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part of a privatization program. This reorganization required civilian control
over nuclear research that had been dominated by the military.
A new Brazilian Constitution was written in 1988 that allowed
nuclear research for only peaceful purposes. The Brazilian military
continued to operate many classified facilities even though the Constitution
outlawed the use of nuclear technology for military purposes. A vivid
example of the Brazilian military's secret efforts to build an atomic weapon
was the discovery of a nuclear test site built in the Amazon. In September
1990, President Collor visited a 320-meter deep hole in Serra do Cachimbo
built by Brazil's former military governments to test nuclear weapons.
According to the Brazilian journal VEGA , this US$1 million hole proved
both the bellicose intentions of the military government and its
irresponsible spending habits. 90 President Collor symbolically sealed the
shaft and promised to end all secret nuclear research by the military.
Table DC provides a summary of the reasons why Argentina and
Brazil have been suspected by the international community of trying to
build nuclear weapons.
95
"Militares: Acao tapa-buraco [Military: Operation Fill the Holes]," (in
Portuguese), VEGA, 26 September 1990, translated and reported by INFO-
SOUTH, (9 November 1990).
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Table IX
A Summary of Argentine and Brazilian Progress towards
Building an Atomic Weapon
a. Ample uranium resources
b. Sophisticated scientific community
(European connections)
c. Large nuclear energy infrastructure
(nuclear fuel cycle complete)
d. Refusal to sign NPT nor comply with
the Treaty of Tlatelolco
e. Clandestine and unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities
f. Delivery systems for nuclear weapons
available (Condor II in Argentina
and Orbita in Brazil)
Argentina and Brazil have the nuclear expertise to build a nuclear
weapon before the end of the century. The decision to build a nuclear
weapon, however, requires substantial financial backing that neither
economy could easily support. It would be difficult for the democratic
governments in Argentina and Brazil to justify such an expense to their
publics.
In August 1991, the Brazilian public learned that US$65 million in a
secret fund was used for nuclear projects by the by the Strategic Affairs
Secretariat (SAE).96 This secret fund purchased centrifuge machinery at
96
"Poco sem fundo [Bottomless Pit]," (in Portuguese), ISTOE SENHOR, 14
August 1991, translated and reported in INFO-SOUTH (7 September 1991).
The Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE) is the Brazilian equivalent to the
National Security Council in the United States.
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the Ipero enrichment plant.9 ' The existence of this fund casts doubt on the
promises made by Collor in the Guadalajara Accord. It questions Collor's
true intentions regarding nuclear weapons, and it shows the danger of
military insubordination in a fledgling democracy. If nuclear weapons are
developed during the 1990s in either nation, it will likely be through defiant
military programs. Therefore, the only way to ensure that these nations do
not produce nuclear weapons will be the establishment of civilian
supremacy over the military.
Leonard Spector warns that "Argentina and Brazil are primed to
cross the nuclear threshold if political winds should shift."98 Full-scope IAEA
safeguards are the best protection against nuclear proliferation "political
winds" change. The next chapter will provide a history of the rivalry
between Argentina and Brazil to explain why a nuclear competition
escalated between these nations.
97
"Uma verba atomica [An Atomic Fund]," (in Portuguese), VEGA, 14
August 1991, translated and reported by INFO-SOUTH (20 September 1991).
98 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,"
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 37.
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VI. HISTORY OF ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN RIVALRY
The struggle for influence between Argentina and Brazil is the oldest
of all Latin American conflicts. It can be traced back to the Treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494 which divided the New World between the Spanish and
Portuguese kingdoms." The cultural differences between the Spanish in
Argentina and Portuguese in Brazil have been a constant source of tension
in Latin America. A declared war between Argentina and Brazil has never
occurred. However, armed confrontations arose on several occasions.
The first military clash occurred over the "Banda Oriental" region in
Uruguay (1825-1828). Later, Brazil used armed incursions into Argentine
territory in an attempt to bring down Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel
Rosas, in the early 1850s. Argentina and Brazil were allies in a "marriage of
convenience" against Paraguay during the 1865-1870 War of the Triple
Alliance. Despite being allies, violent confrontations between the Argentine
and Brazilian militaries erupted in Paraguay during this war. A series of
minor confrontations over borders continued into the twentieth century. 100
99 Stanley J. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), 3-27.
100 Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflicts in Latin America: Quarrels Among
Neighbors (New York: Praeger, 1984), 101.
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The Argentina and Brazil have a history of competition for the
leadership of the South American continent. Many Argentines believe that
their Brazilian neighbors are unsophisticated and barbaric. A comparison
between Argentina and Brazil is often made using the differences between
their national dances: the tango and the samba. The tango is a metaphor to
explain the sense of refinement and sophistication in Argentina. 101 The
samba expresses the raw passion and energy in the large Brazilian
republic. 102
The Argentine sense of superiority over Brazil is rooted in its cultural
and intellectual traditions. Argentine history is full with articulate
intellectuals espousing the virtues of modernization and technology. It has
maintained close cultural ties with Europeans. Argentine literature praises
the need for technology and material progress to achieve a destiny left by
their European ancestors. In the mid- 1800s, authors like Domingo
Sarmiento and Jose Marmol were instrumental in directing Argentine
development. Sarmiento wrote Civilization and Barbarism in 1845 and
Marmol wrote Amalia in 1855. 103 These influential books are an example
of the importance of modernization and progress in the Argentine tradition.
101 Cristina Bonasegna, "Buenos Aires: Cosmopolitan, Contradictory,
Passionate," The Christian Science Monitor (27 June 1991), 10-11.
102 Amy Duncan, "Samba: Soul of Carnival," The Christian Science Monitor
(25 October 1990), 10-11.
103
E. Bradford Burns, Latin America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1990), 90.
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Thus, Argentina believes itself to be the leader in Latin America because of
its social, cultural and scientific achievements.
In contrast to Argentina, Brazil's perception of Latin American
leadership results from its massive size. Brazil's aspiration to regional
leadership has been analyzed extensively. 104 The Brazilian faith in
national "greatness" on the Latin American continent can be compared with
the United States belief in Manifest Destiny. Brazil, like the United States
in the 19th century, believes it will to evolve into a world power. Brazil has
expressed interest in negotiating a commercial outlet to the Pacific and has
placed a high priority on using the vast commercial potential of the
Amazon.
Some Brazilian geopolitical writers claim that a coming age of a Pax
Brasiliana will replace the declining Pax Americana . Brazil believes itself to
be the "Colossus of the South" that will fulfill its destiny by becoming the
first world power to emerge from the southern hemisphere. The economic
crisis of the 1980s has quieted the champions of Brazilian greatness.
However, nationalism continues to be a powerful political force. Jack Child
104 Analysis of Brazilian desires for international status may be found in
Riordan Roett, "Brazil and the United States," Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs (Volume 27, Number 1, 1985), 1-17 and Wayne
Selcher, Ed., Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981).
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argues that "Brazil's path to greatness is seen as a distinct threat by most
Argentines." 105
Brazil cooperated closely with the United States from World War II
until the late 1970s. The goal of Brazilian cooperation with the United
States was to obtain essential foreign investment and technology in order to
build a first-class economy. The pro-U.S. alignment of Brazil received the
scorn of the other South American nations that were distancing themselves
from the United States during the 1960s. Argentina had bitter foreign
relations with Brazil (and Chile). Argentina thought it was threatened by a
conspiracy of its neighbors. The Argentine military resented the U.S.
cooperation with Brazil because its qualitative advantage over the Brazilian
military slowly eroded.
When Brazilian relations with the United States soured during the
Carter administration, Brazil's relations with its Latin American neighbors
improved. Brazil no longer appeared to be a U.S. proxy. Brazil began to
emphasize South-South economic and political relations and improved its
relations with Argentina. In 1979, General Figueiredo became the first
Brazilian president to visit Buenos Aires in 45 years. 106 Jack Child notes
105 Jack Child, "The Status of South American Geopolitical Thinking," in G.
Pope Atkins, Ed., South America Into The 1990s: Evolving International
Relationships In A New Era (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 62.
106 Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and the Southern Cone Subsystem," in G.
Pope Atkins, Ed., South America Into The 1990s, 94.
65
that "the loosening of traditional United States-Brazilian ties permitted the
unprecedented strengthening of Argentine-Brazilian links." 107
The roller coaster of Argentine-Brazilian relations, however,
continued during the 1980s, primarily because of the Falklands War. The
failure of Brazil (and especially Chile) to side enthusiastically with
Argentina during the Falklands War renewed Argentina's suspicions of its
neighbors. The Argentine military feared that Brazil might take advantage
of the turmoil following the defeat in the Falklands to attack Argentina. 108
The sense of isolation felt by Argentina during the Falklands War fueled the
desire to build an atomic weapon.
A. ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR COMPETITION
The nuclear aspect of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry poses disturbing
questions because both countries are "threshold nations" capable of
developing a nuclear weapon before the end of this decade. Neither nation
has faced an external threat that might arguably call for the development of
a nuclear deterrent. 109 The interests in acquiring nuclear technology were
for reasons of national pride and to satisfy energy needs. A nuclear arms
race began because both viewed nuclear development to be an important
factor in their enduring competition for regional preeminence. At a
107
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66
minimum, neither could afford to fall behind the other in the development
of nuclear weapons.
Argentina and Brazil are not members to the NPT. President Collor
expressed Brazil's reasons for not becoming a member of the NPT as follows
(Argentina has similar reasons for refusing to sign the NPT):
Brazil did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it creates
difficulties for access to technology...the NPT is a straightjacket that
would hinder our access to new forms of technology that are
fundamental to the prosperity of Brazil. 110
Collor's view on the NPT is not universally accepted in Brazil. Former
Brazilian Senator Roberto Campos claimed Collor's interpretation of the
NPT is wrong. According to Campos, when Brazil refused to sign the NPT,
it unleashed widespread suspicions about Brazilian nuclear intentions. This
caused international restrictions on Brazilian acquisition of nuclear
technology. Instead of reaching technological autonomy by rejecting the
NPT, Brazil embarked on a path of technological isolation (from the United
States). 111
110
"Collor Views the NPT," (in Spanish), EXCELSIOR , 16 July 1991,
translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-
91-148, 1 August 1991), 32-38.
111 Roberto Campos, "Os orfaos da historia [The Orphans of History]," (in
Portuguese), ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 17 September 1989, translated and
reported by INFO-SOUTH (10 October 1990).
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European countries catered to the Argentine-Brazilian desire to
obtain nuclear technology and refused to follow the technology transfer
restrictions desired by the United States. The major Western European
powers have competed in the highly lucrative trade of selling nuclear
technology for "peaceful" purposes to Argentina and Brazil. While there are
restraints on the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,
they are often vague and uncertain. As a result, nuclear energy programs
can be pursued that, while ostensibly for peaceful purposes, have at least a
partial military application. 112
B. DECLINE OF MILITARY TENSIONS
The reduction in military tension began during the mid-1980s.
Evidence of the decreased military tensions between Argentina and Brazil
can be drawn from the four following developments.
First, the Argentine armed forces will reduce their troop strength by
30% by the year 2000. A plan submitted to President Menem by Defense
Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez will cut the Argentine armed forces from
the current level of 95,000 troops to approximately 65,000 troops. 113 The
Brazilian armed forces will also undergo significant reductions from their
current size of 320,000 troops, but the percentages to be cut have not been
112 Morris, Controlling Latin American Conflicts, 120.
113
"Armed Forces to Reduce, Sell Property," (in Spanish), MADRID EFE ,
17 August 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS-LAT-91-160, 19 August 1991), 15.
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announced. 114 Second, in August 1991, Argentine President Menem,
Brazilian President Collor and Chilean President Patricio Aylwin signed a
commitment to ban chemical and biological weapons from their
countries. 115 Third, the nuclear agreement signed with Brazil during the
Guadalajara summit in July 1991 includes confidence-building measures
that will reduce suspicion and distrust. The mutual inspections established
by the Guadalajara Accord open many previously classified military
installations. The rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil is
understandable because neither state would want to start a costly arms
race.
116
The cooperation displayed in arms control and international
agreements offers proof that their historical rivalry between Argentina and
Brazil may have ended. The most compelling evidence that the military
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil has ended is the increasing
integration of their economies. The steps being taken towards a common
economic market between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay appear to
be ushering in a new era in international cooperation in South America.
114
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115
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The reduced tensions between Argentina and Brazil make the
formation of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) possible. The
principle of free market capitalism has replaced the statist economic policies
that ran the Latin American economies into bankruptcy during the late
1970s and 1980s. 117 The "lost decade" of the 1980s caused an overall
decline in GNP and standards of living. The end of the Argentine-Brazilian
rivalry could produce an important "peace dividend" because of reduced
defense spending and increased trade.
Under the Mercosur common market, Argentina and Brazil will
reduce tariffs by 20% a year beginning in 1990, reaching zero tariffs by
1994. President Collor called Mercosur "the starting point for overcoming
the effects of economic recession, of technological inadequacies, and of social
backwardness in our countries." 118
Mercosur will provide a stepping stone in the eventual completion of
the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI) announced by President
Bush in June 1990. The EAI promises to make a common economic market
117 An interesting comparison between the economic problems occurring in
the Soviet Union and Latin America is made in Julia Michaels, "Will the
Soviets Learn a Latin Lesson?" The Christian Science Monitor (23 August
1991), 6.
118
"Brazil and Partners Launch Mercosur," Latin American Regional
Reports: Brazil Report (RB-91-04, 2 May 1991), 8.
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from Alaska to Argentina. 119 President Bush wants regional economic
markets established before integration with the U.S. market can be
completed. Therefore, the end to the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil
is an essential step towards the eventual establishment of a hemispheric
common market.
119 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The
Enterprise For The Americas Initiative (101st Congress, 2nd Session, 27
September 1990).
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VII. DEMOCRATIZATION AND "DENUCLEARIZATION'
This chapter addresses the relationship between the growth of
democracy and decline in nuclear weapons research programs in Argentina
and Brazil. Civilian leaders in both nations terminated secret programs
begun by the preceding military governments. Most funding for clandestine
nuclear programs was cut by the civilian presidents in both nations. In the
1991 Guadalajara Accord, Presidents Menem and Collor stated that the
pursuit of nuclear weapons was a wasteful adventure that must be stopped.
The return of democratic rule improved relations between Argentina and
Brazil. The civilian leadership took steps to reduced the suspicions that
justified investments in nuclear weapons made by the past military
governments.
The consolidation of democracy in Argentina and Brazil is not
complete. The civilian leaders are confronted with the difficult task of
redefining the role of the military. In general, Latin American nations have
a historical cycle of military interventions. The political strengths of the
military often made it the most effective institution in Argentina and
72
Brazil. 120 Figure 3 illustrates the cyclical nature of military coups common










Cycle of Military Intervention
Argentina has experienced six military coups since 1930. The last
military regime took power in 1976 and ruled Argentina until Raul Alfonsin
was elected in 1983. Unsuccessful Argentine military uprisings recently
120 The centralized command structure, organization, and military virtues
of the armed forces are political strengths that civilian political institutions in
Latin America often lacked. The political weaknesses of the military result
from inadequate techno-bureaucratic skills, over-reliance on structure, and
most important, a lack of legitimacy to rule the society. See Samuel E. Finer,
The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall
Press, 1962), 11.
121 Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development (Itasca: Peacock
Publishers, 1989), Chapter 6.
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occurred in 1987 and 1990. 122 Brazilian history differs from this cycle of
military intervention because its armed forces refused to rule the nation
directly until the 1964 military coup. The Brazilian military did, however,
rule the nation from 1964 until 1985.
Military coups often result because of a combination of factors that
"pull" and/or "push" the armed forces into politics. 123 Military coups are
often invited by instability in the civilian government. The middle class
encourages (or pulls) the military to take over the government to return law
and order. On the other hand, different influences arise within the armed
forces causing the military to "push" itself into politics. Military leaders
want to take over the government to protect against leftist insurgencies or
to secure larger defense budgets. When a military takes control of the
government it soon finds that the inherent contradictions of military rule
threaten the institution of the armed forces. The "military as an institution"
becomes endangered by the role of "military as government." 124
122 Julia Michaels, "Argentina Reassess Military Role," The Christian
Science Monitor (16 July 1991), 6.
123 The term "overt intervention" by the military into politics is used by
Abraham F. Lowenthal, and J. Sammuel Fitch, Armies and Politics in Latin
America (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), Chapter 1.
124 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 6.
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A. REASONS FOR THE RETURN OF CIVILIAN RULE
The Argentine and Brazilian militaries withdrew from control of the
government during the 1980s in an effort to maintain the integrity of the
armed forces. The institution of the armed forces is focused on the
organizational, structural, and prestige needs of the military.
The performance of the military government affects the popular
perceptions of the entire military. Mismanagement by the military
government leads to a dramatic loss of prestige for the institution of the
armed forces. Eventually, military leaders see the need to narrow the
concerns of the military to the needs of the armed forces institution, not
running the entire government. This leads to the military's eventual
disengagement from politics.
The economic problems confronting Argentina and Brazil motivated
the military to disengage from politics and encouraged the return to civilian
rule during the 1980s. The international debt crisis inspired the military to
retreat from governing because the astronomical debt service payments
consuming the national budget. Simplistically stated, the military desired to
get "back to basics" by leaving government to civilians and concentrating on
the individual needs of the armed forces.
The Brazilian people traditionally admired the military, but the tales
of corruption and incompetence tarnished the military's reputation. The
Argentine military was disgraced by the defeat in the Falklands war. The
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institutional needs of the armed forces required the return of political power
to civilians. The military would take a back seat to civilian presidents, but
still held considerable influence from behind the scenes.
The armed forces thought they could have the best of both worlds,
leaving the government, but still retaining the prerogatives of power
enjoyed while ruling the nation. Some of the prerogatives retained by the
Argentine and Brazilian militaries were control over the military budget,
regular pay raises, and an active duty membership in the civilian
president's Cabinet.
A problem for the military arose because the liberalization increased
the strength of political opposition movements in the early 1980s. Thomas
Bruneau declared that "the initial opening stimulated the rebirth of civil
society."125 The military could no longer control the liberalization process.
Liberalization began as an effort to stabilize authoritarian rule and may not
have originally intended to evolve into full democratization. This
liberalization strengthened opposition to the military government, and the
pressures for the return to democratic civilian rule increased beyond the
expectations of the military government. 126
125 Thomas Bruneau, "Brazil", in John Higley and Richard Gunther, Eds.,
Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe
(Austin: Univ. of Texas, forthcoming- 1991), 9.
126 John Orme, "Dismounting the Tiger: Lessons from Four Liberalizations,"
Political Science Quarterly (Volume 103, Number 2, Summer 1988), 245-265.
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The people of Argentina elected Raul Alfonsin as president in 1983 to
replace the military government of General Galtieri who was disgraced by
the Falklands War. In 1985, Brazil elected a civilian president, Tancredo
Neves, (with Jose Sarney as Vice President) marking the end to Brazilian
military rule. 127
The military in both nations still retained many prerogatives during
the 1980s. But the reins of political power were no longer monopolized by
the military. Alfred Stepan in Rethinking Military Politics, has an
outstanding analysis of the changing military prerogatives in Argentina and
Brazil. Figure 4 provides an updated version of chart used by Stepan to
show the trends in declining prerogatives and increasing contestation by the
armed force in both nations.
127 Jose Sarney assumed the Presidency because of the unexpected illness
and death ofTancredo Neves in 1985. The military allowed Sarney to rise from







































Updated Version ofAlfred Stepan's Analysis on Military Prerogatives
in Argentina and Brazil
The civilian governments in both Argentina and Brazil have
experienced increased contestation from their respective militaries since
1985. The high points of conflict between the Argentine military and the
government occurred during the 1987 Easter week mutinies 128 and the
128 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics , 122.
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failed December 1990 military coup. 129 The Argentine military is under
firmer civilian control since this failed coup. The rising contestation between
the government and military in Brazil has surrounded the issues of low
military pay and declining budgets. 130
The popularity of the Argentine military has diminished because of
its past human rights abuses. The defense budget was reduced in 1991 to
less than 1.4 percent of GNP. 131 In 1987, Argentina's military budget was
over 3.3 percent of GNP. 132 President Menem succeeded Alfonsin in 1989
and continued to reduce the political power of the military. Not only did
Menem reduce the defense budget, he discontinued the prestigious ballistic
missile program.
On 3 June 1991, Menem called for all parts of the Condor II missile
project to be deactivated and dismantled. The Argentine air force sees the
end of the Condor II missile program as a major blow to its prestige.
Menem's rapprochement with Brazil is causing discontent among senior
129
"Fact Sheet: The President's Trip to Argentina," U.S. Department of
State Dispatch (10 December 1990), 326, and Christina Bonasegna, "Argentine
Revolt Reveals Lingering Army Tensions," The Christian Science Monitor (5
December 1990), 1.
130 James Brooke, "Tree Falling Salaries' Anger Brazil's Military," The New
York Times (6 December 1990), A4.
131 Julia Michaels, "Argentina Reassesses Military Role," The Christian
Science Monitor (16 July 1991), 6.
132 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfers - 1987 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1988), 32.
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military officers. The Argentine military distrusts Brazil and does not want
to open its more advanced nuclear program to Brazil. Retired Air Force
General Ernesto Crespo said that "Argentina mil become a banana republic
if it allows another nation to decide the future of the Condor II [referring to
the United States]." 133 This is an example of the growing discontent in the
Argentine military, but it is also shows the decline in the political power of
the armed forces.
In Brazil, President Collor had a series of serious confrontations with
powerful generals soon after his inauguration. In his inaugural statement,
Collor claimed to have "a silver bullet" capable of "killing inflation."
Following the speech, retired General Newton Cruz insulted the President
by saying that "a statesman with only one bullet in his revolver should use
it against his own head."134 Collor punished Newton Cruz with a 10-day
arrest for the insult. This punishment had repercussions throughout the
military. It showed that Collor was willing and able to confront the military,
and demonstrated the growing power of the civilian presidency.
Financial problems trouble the Brazilian military. Shortages of
munitions, obsolete weaponry, a lack of uniforms, rationed food, and low
133
"Argentina Condor Missile," Latin American Regional Reports: Southern
Cone Report (RS-91-05, 7 July 1991), 2.
134
"Collor Has Public Clash With Generals", Latin American Regional
Reports Brazil (RB-90-04, 3 May 1990), 6.
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pay are now the main features of the Brazilian Armed forces. 135
Discontent exists at all ranks of the Brazilian military. The issue of military
salaries and pensions being eroded by inflation became a springboard that
launched many retired military men into politics. The revival of the Clube
Militar (Military Club) with its history of considerable political influence is
a mouthpiece for conservatives to support for the military. The Military
Club was an active political force before the 1964 coup. On 5 December
1990, the 25,000 member Military Club sought an injunction from the
Supreme Court to improve military pay. Due to inflation, an army general
now earns $19,000 a year while a Congressman earns $54,000 a year. 136
In June 1991, the Brazilian Congress denied the military a 20% pay
raise, while at the same time granting congressional employees a 36% pay
increase. President Collor openly condemned the vote by Congress and sided
with the military on this issue. A small pay raise was finally given to the
military in the fall. This is one example of how rising military contestation
is destabilizing Brazil's democracy. It will be difficult to consolidate
democratic rule in such a strained environment. Unfortunately, the tensions
appear likely to continue. 137
135
"Military Frustrated by Lack of Funds," Latin American Regional
Reports: Brazil Report (RB-91-06, 11 July 1991), 4-5.
136 James Brooke, "Free Falling Salaries Anger Brazil's Military", The New
York Times (6 December 1990), A4.
137 James Brooke, "Brazil's President Backs Army Over Congress," The New
York Times (4 August 1991), A17.
81
B. PROCESS OF NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT
Until the mid-1980s, the armed forces in both Argentina and Brazil
had considerable autonomy over nuclear facilities. The nuclear
rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil accelerated once civilian
presidents replaced the military governments.
In 1985, the President Alfonsin reversed the nuclear policy of the
preceding military government when he declared that Argentina would
require IAEA safeguards for all nuclear exports from Argentina. In
November 1985, at Foz de Iguacu, on the Brazil-Argentina border, Alfonsin
met with Brazilian President Sarney, to sign a bilateral accords that
included a joint declaration on nuclear policy. The declaration stressed the
importance of nuclear research for only peaceful purposes. 138
In March 1986, a joint Argentine-Brazilian nuclear commission
agreed on the concept of mutual inspections, but insisted that any such
system would be independent of the IAEA. Any international inspections,
especially IAEA safeguards, were considered to be an infringement of
Argentine and Brazilian sovereignty. On 28 April 1986, a nuclear accident
occurred at the Chernobyl reactor in the Soviet Union. Presidents' Alfonsin
and Sarney agreed to create an early warning system to notify each other in
case of a similar accident. 139
138 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 226.
139 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 225.
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A series of confidence-building visits to nuclear facilities was use to
eliminate suspicions between Argentina and Brazil. In December 1986,
Argentine nuclear specialists visited Brazil's classified nuclear research
center at the Institute for Nuclear and Energy Research (IPEN) at
University of Sao Paulo. The facilities visited included an experimental
centrifuge enrichment unit and a laboratory-scale plutonium extraction
facility, neither of which was subject to IAEA safeguards. In July 1987,
President Sarney toured the Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant.
Sarney visited Buenos Aires for a fifth summit with Alfonsin in
November 1988. Sarney visited the plutonium extraction plant at Ezeiza.
They signed another joint declaration on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
President Menem was inaugurated in the spring of 1989. He took
action to place all Argentine nuclear programs under civilian control. In
July 1989, Menem named a civilian, Dr. Manuel Mondino, to become
Chairman of the CNEA. Menem overlooked Admiral Carlos Castro Madero
who had greater experience and was a ranking member in his Peronist
party. In March 1990, work on the Ezeiza plutonium extraction plant was
indefinitely frozen because the "project was no longer a priority" according
to CNEA Chairman Mondino. 140
Collor became Brazil's president in March 1990. He named Jose"
Goldemberg as Secretary of Science and Technology to control the nation's
140 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions , 232.
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nuclear programs. Goldemberg was a well-known critic of the "parallel"
nuclear programs. Collor set a priority goal to establish complete civilian
control over all nuclear research. He demanded an end to all secret
"parallel" programs. The last secret nuclear program became public on 9
November 1990, when a commission of national deputies and scientists of
the Congressional Investigative Committee (CPI) inspected an Army nuclear
laboratory in Rio de Janeiro. The Army secretly conducted research on the
25 square-kilometer facility since 1986. The goal of the CPI is to enforce
civilian oversight of all nuclear research. 141
In November 1990, Presidents Collor and Menem met in Foz do
Iguacu, Brazil, to sign an agreement promising to end all secret nuclear
research. The agreement claims that the nuclear rivalry between Argentina
and Brazil could be overcome through the sharing of technology and firm
commitments against nuclear weapons. This agreement was signed before
President Bush's visit to the region in December 1990. This pact formally
reversed years of secret efforts to build a nuclear bomb. The Guadalajara
agreement continued the process begun at Foz do Iguacu. It marks an
141
"Commission Visits Army Nuclear Complex", (in Portuguese), O Globo ,
19 July 1990, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS-LAT-90-120, 23 July 1990), 64.
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important step towards completing the Latin American nuclear weapons-
free zone conceived in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 142
The Argentine and Brazilian militaries became disgruntled with their
fall from power during the 1980s. The aborted coup in Argentina on 3
December 1990, showed the fragile nature of democracy. 143 The power of
civilian governments is increasing in both nations. The fact that military
budgets can be cut and the prestigious Condor II can be abandoned shows
the growing strength of civilian leadership. Nuclear weapons programs were
a high priority for the military governments of the 1980s, but they were
never a higher priority than adequate pay and increasing military budgets.
The Argentine and Brazilian militaries are confronted with declining
budgets. The opposition to ending nuclear weapons research exists, but
concern over pay and promotions is a far greater concern. The possibility of
a military coup does exist. "No one in Argentina can guarantee there will be
no other military uprising."144 Even if this does occur, the primary reason
will be due to issues of pay and promotions. It is unlikely that the military
would invest heavily in nuclear weapons research because of the costs
involved.
142
"Brazil and Argentina Ban the Bomb," The New York Times (5
December 1990), A19.
143 James Brooke, "Debt and Democracy", The New York Times (4
December 1990), A6.
144 Michaels, "Argentina Reassesses Military Role," 6.
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Argentina cannot even afford to keep its nuclear power plants
operating. The Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) has
a debt of more than $20 million with a local enterprise that provides
nuclear reactor fuel. The financial trouble of the CNEA makes it unable to
pay its suppliers. This may cause the seven nuclear reactors in Argentina
that produce 900 megawatts of electricity to close down. 145 The nuclear
weapons programs are far too expensive for the uncertain return that they
could bring to the society. The Atucha I and Embalse power plants have
experienced technical difficulties and maintenance problems. In late 1987,
both nuclear power plants had technical problems that caused blackouts in
Buenos Aries. In August 1988, the Atucha I reactor malfunctioned and was
out of operation until January 1990. While Atucha I was out of commission,
the Embalse reactor shutdown in December 1988 causing nationwide power
outages. The Argentine government declared a state of emergency. The
nation's electrical system ran under emergency procedures for several days.
A nationwide debate on energy policy ensued that exhibited a distrust of
nuclear power. 146
145 There exists the possibility that CNEA is exaggerating its financial
troubles as a bureaucratic ploy to obtain larger budget commitments from the
Menem administration. "Nuclear Plants Could Close Due to Lack of Fuel," (in
Spanish), NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS, 26 July 1991, translated and reported in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-145, 29 July 1991), 29.
146
"Energy Crisis Heightened," (in Spanish), NACION, 28 December 1988,
translated and reported by INFO-SOUTH (22 March 1989).
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During the 1980s, the international community (and the United
States in particular) began limit Argentine and Brazilian access to dual-use
technology because of their pursuit of nuclear weapons. The civilian
government in Argentina and Brazil were force to examine the costs and
benefits of investments in nuclear weapons research. It appears that civilian
leadership decided that the costs of pursuing nuclear weapons exceeded the
potential benefits of ever acquiring one. Therefore, the civilian governments
will no longer support the expense of pursuing these weapons programs.
The civilian leaders in Argentina and Brazil realized that they must
change the nuclear policies of past military governments, if they are going
to become the First World nations. Neither country could afford to lose
access to U.S. and Western European technology. The following statement
by President Collor expresses the importance of technology in the post-cold
war world.
The end of the cold war brings a new kind of bipolarity that will divide
the world between rich developed nations-owners of both capital and
technology and those other nations that lack capital and access to
advanced knowledge, will be unable to change their tragic social status
quo. 147
147
"Collor on Nuclear Treaty," Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS-LAT-91-139, 19 July 1991), 25.
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In summary, the increased strength of democratic rule speeded the
process of nuclear rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil. Table X
summarizes the potential benefits of "denuclearization."
Table X
Potential Benefits of Abandoning Nuclear Weapons Development
in Argentina and Brazil
a. Receive economic rewards from the international community,
such as:
- The Enterprise of the Americas Initiative
- Access to technology & investment
- Debt restructuring and new loans (Brady Plan)
b. Complete the process of regional economic integration begun in
the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur).
c. Establish civilian supremacy over the armed forces in an area
where past military prerogatives existed.
d. Build an advanced technological base and a more prosperous
economy with the potential ability to renew nuclear weapons
research in a few years, if the political situation changes.
The declared end of nuclear weapons research in Argentina and
Brazil is a positive step in global nonproliferation. Table XI presents some




Potential Costs of Abandoning Nuclear Weapons Development in
Argentina and Brazil
Perceived loss of national autonomy and sovereignty, making
the government a target for nationalistic opposition
movements.
Additional confrontation between civilian government and the
military (increased possibility of a coup?)
Forfeiture of a potentially lucrative export market in nuclear
and ballistic missile technology.
When one compares the costs and benefits presented in Tables X and
XI, it appears prudent for the civilian leaders to end the pursuit of nuclear
weapons. Argentine and Brazilian leaders hope that the decision to end
nuclear weapons pursuits will produce an economic windfall for their
nations. It is as if they expect the Guadalajara Accord to provide each
nation with increased access to technology, reduce government deficits, and
expand trade between their nations. The next chapter examines the
strengths and weaknesses of the Guadalajara agreement.
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VIII. THE GUADALAJARA ACCORD
The Guadalajara Accord is the latest stage in the tradition of
confidence-building measures begun in 1985 at Foz de Iguacu by Presidents
Alfonsin and Sarney. It continues the spirit of cooperation started by the
reciprocal visits to classified nuclear facilities. These visits by Brazilian
President Sarney to Pilcaniyeu uranium enrichment plant in July 1987, and
the April 1988 by Argentine President Alfonsin to Brazil's enrichment
facility at IPEN. Spector notes that "unfortunately, these confidence-
building initiatives do not permit either country to monitor the quantities
and enrichment level of uranium produced at these plants." 148
A. STRENGTHS OF THE GUADALAJARA ACCORD
The history of nuclear rapprochement preceding the Guadalajara
Accord provides for the major strength of this agreement. Before the signing
of this agreement, there existed ample evidence of the efforts made in both
nations to end nuclear weapons research. U.S. Ambassador-at-large Richard
Kennedy met with President Menem in May 1990. He reported that "there
is little if any cause for suspicion" that Argentina is using its nuclear
program for belligerent purposes. In late June 1991, Argentine Defense
Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick
148 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,"
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 43.
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Cheney. Gonzalez claimed that Argentina has no intention of participating
in a nuclear arms race nor has any intention of acquiring other "mass
destruction" weapons. 149
Evidence of Argentina's commitment to end its efforts to produce
nuclear weapons research continues to be seen since the Guadalajara
agreement. In August 1991, Vice President Danforth Quayle visited
Argentina to expressed thanks for their participation in the Persian Gulf
conflict. Quayle said the Argentine decision to abolish the Condor II project
and to sign the Guadalajara Accord will improve U.S.-Argentine relations.
Menem guaranteed Quayle that all advanced technology "will remain
exclusively subordinated to civilian power." 150
The Brazil's commitment to the Guadalajara agreement equals
Argentina's. On an official visit to Washington, Collor stated his government
will "re-direct nuclear development away from the quest for a [nuclear]
bomb." 151 Not only is Brazil ending all nuclear weapons research, it is
149 See Goldman, "U.S. Endorses Menem's Nuclear Plan's," 9, and
"Argentina: No mass destruction weapons," Latin American Regional Reports:
Brazil Report (RB-91-06, 8 August 1991), 8.
150
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ARGENTINAS, 6 August 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-152, 7 August 1991), 30. The agreement
guarantees $1.6 million in U.S. technological assistance. Despite the small
amount of money, President Menem declared it "an extremely important
action" because it involves "vital technology."
151
"Autonomous Technological Development," Latin American Regional
Reports: Brazil Report (RB-91-06, 11 July 1991), 5.
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curtailing its development of nuclear power reactors. Collor suspended the
construction of Angra-II and Angra II reactors in July 1991. Financial
difficulties continue to trouble Collor's administration and prevent the
completion of these costly nuclear power plants. 152
President Collor strived to make the Brazilian nuclear program as
"transparent" as possible. 153 Collor responded to the following question at
the Guadalajara conference: "Can your government guarantee an end to
nuclear weapons development?"
That is why I went personally, and with a shovelful of lime, I plugged
the hole in the pipeline that was built [in Cachimbo] for atomic testing.
I made the gesture so that everything would be relegated to the past.
That was a different Brazil, a different world. Today there are new
horizons. Brazil and Argentina have put an end to the nuclear arms
race. The two countries with the most advanced nuclear technology in
Latin America used to copy each other and confront each other. Today
we are moving towards cooperation. 154
The ending of this historical rivalry is the most convincing reason to
believe both nations will abandon nuclear weapons research. The primary
reason to build an atomic weapon is to deter aggression by an adversary.
152
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July 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service
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United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 1991.
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The end to Argentine-Brazilian bellicose rivalry removes the primary
external threat to both nations.
B. WEAKNESSES OF THE GUADALAJARA ACCORD
The Guadalajara accord does not offer solutions to two major
proliferation threats. The accord is flawed because it does not require full-
scope safeguards by the IAEA and it allows the continued development of a
nuclear submarine research.
1. Lack of Full-Scope Safeguards by the IAEA
The accord does not require full-scope IAEA safeguards because
both Argentina and Brazil see any intrusive inspections to be a violation of
national sovereignty. Argentina and Brazil discussed expanding the partial
IAEA safeguards currently used at some nuclear facilities. In March 1991,
in anticipation of the Ibero-American conference in Guadalajara, Argentina
and Brazil began the process of negotiating a joint safeguards agreement
with the IAEA. These negotiations are not for full-scope safeguards, but
only for expanding the number of facilities under the existing safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. 155
The IAEA negotiations are a long and detailed process. The
Guadalajara agreement established an interim organization to verify that
both nations follow a "common system of accounting and control of nuclear
155 Joe Goldman, "U.S. Endorses Menem's Nuclear Plan's," The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (Volume 46, Number 6, July August 1990), 9-10.
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materials." The bi-national agency is called the Agenda Brasileno-
Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC). This
organization was first proposed by Presidents Raul Alfonsin and Jose
Sarney. In August 1991, Presidents Menem and Collor de Mello signed a
protocol establishing diplomatic immunities for the ABACC to oversee
nuclear activities in both countries. 156
The ABACC will not conduct intrusive inspections of nuclear
facilities. The ABACC will only use accounting procedures to measure
designated quantities of fissile material. This bilateral inspection
organization is not as effective as IAEA. The IAEA can best ensure
Argentine and Brazilian compliance with the NPT or Treaty of Tlatelolco.
The United States should insist on "full-scope" IAEA safeguards before
transferring dual-use technology (like the IBM supercomputer) to Argentina
or Brazil.
Brazil and Argentina were scheduled to sign an IAEA
safeguards agreement in Vienna, Austria, on 18 September 1991. The
signing was delayed and the IAEA negotiations are likely to drag on. The
Brazilian Congress continues to oppose any increase in IAEA
156
"Collor assina acordo com Menem sobre arma quimica, [Collor Signs
Agreement with Menem about Chemical Weapons]," (in Portuguese), FOLHA
DE SAO PAULO, 20 August 1991, translated and reported by INFO-SOUTH
(13 September 1991).
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inspections. 157 The legislature in Argentina also has reservations about
increased IAEA inspections. 158
2. Development of a Nuclear Submarine
The Guadalajara Accord does not prevent the development of
nuclear submarines. Nuclear submarine research is likely to continue in
both nations (especially Brazil). The agreement states that:
Article II. Nothing in the provisions of this Accord shall affect the
inalienable right of the Parties to carry out research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Article III. [Nothing will] restrict the use of nuclear energy for the
propulsion or operation of any type of vehicle, including submarines. 159
Nuclear submarines provide the opportunity to divert nuclear
materials to weapons programs and lend legitimacy to indigenous
enrichment facilities. Once Argentina or Brazil acquired the ability to
produce nuclear fuels for naval propulsion, the country would remain free to
use the materials for nuclear weapons. Even the most intrusive inspections
by the IAEA would be unable to ensure that weapons-grade material
157
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"Industrial Secret"], (in Portuguese), GAZETA MERCANTIL , 30 July 1991,
translated and reported by INFO-SOUTH (16 July 1991).
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. 30 July 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-167, 28 August 1991), 38.
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produced for a submarine reactor was not being diverted for nuclear
explosives. 160 Articles II and III of the Guadalajara Accord provide a
loophole for nuclear weapons programs to continue in the future.
It is unlikely that either nation will build a nuclear submarine
in the next decade because of existing financial problems. The Argentine
Navy budget for 1991 cannot fund essential repairs on the only aircraft
carrier (25 de Mayo ) in its fleet. Argentina also postponed the construction
of a TR-1700 diesel submarine. Brazil is more aggressive in its nuclear
submarine research than Argentina. The Brazilian navy, however, has
made the upgrading its shipboard anti-aircraft defenses a higher priority
than the costly development of a nuclear submarine. 161
Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek disappointed the
navy when he suggested Brazil would stop production of a nuclear
submarine. Rezek identified concerns about U.S. technology transfers to be
driving the discussion to shelve the nuclear submarine program. The
Foreign Ministry believes that increased technology transfer is essential to
Brazil's economic survival. Brazilian military leaders claim that any
decision to halt production of the nuclear submarine would harm the
160 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,"
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 63.
161 Robert L. Scheina, "Latin American Naval Review," Naval Institute
Proceedings (Volume 117, March 1991), 88-94.
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country's strategic designs by compromising its national sovereignty. 162
The Brazilian navy appears to have the political strength to ensure the
continuation of the nuclear submarine project.
In acknowledging these problems, the Guadalajara Accord is still an
important step in reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation in Latin
America. It is successful because it reduces suspicions between Argentina
and Brazil. It provides confidence-building measures and eliminates the
rationale for building a nuclear weapon. The Guadalajara Accord is not a
new or radical idea; rather, it is just the latest step in a process of nuclear
rapprochement begun in 1985. Presidents Menem and Collor have concluded
that nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil proved to be a wasteful
adventure for both nations. Popular sentiment in Argentina and Brazil
appears to be decidedly anti-nuclear. 163 The populations in Argentina and
Brazil are aware of the potential economic gains that result from improved
relations, cooperation, and trade. The bellicose rivalry between these two
nations has subsided. The hope for prosperity to return is alive.
The next chapter addresses U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy
asking the following questions: How should the United States respond to
162
"Exagerado otimismo [Exaggerated Optimism]," (in Portuguese),
ESTADO DE SAO PAULO , 14 June 1991, translated and reported by INFO-
SOUTH (7 July 1991).
163 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,''
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 40.
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the "denuclearization" in Latin America? Should the United States allow
increased technology transfers of advanced technology? Or, should the U.S.
continue to hesitate to sell dual-use technology to Argentina and Brazil
because of their refusal to complete the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the
]Sjprp9l64
164
"O fulcro da questao [The Crux of the Question]," (in Portuguese),
ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 11 August 1991, translated and reported by INFO-
SOUTH (13 September 1991).
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IX. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY
U.S. non-proliferation policy is based upon the judgement that the
spread of atomic weapons would result in new threats to American security.
An increase in the number of nuclear weapons states could heighten global
and regional instabilities, and raise the probability of nuclear weapons use.
The non-proliferation efforts of the United States have followed three broad
avenues:
1 - to reduce the political incentives that could lead a nation to decide
to build a nuclear weapon;
2 - to make it technically more difficult to build a nuclear weapon
through export controls and nuclear supply regimes;
3 - to encourage and strengthen international non-proliferation
institutions (IAEA, Zangger, London Group). 165
The United States cannot prevent the development of nuclear
weapons by withholding technology transfers. In 1945, the Manhattan
Project did not have a "supercomputer" and it was able to build an atomic
weapon. It is almost impossible to prevent a nation from building nuclear
weapons, if it is willing to dedicate itself to their production. The technology
to build atomic weapon is readily available. A successful non-proliferation
policy tries to reduce the incentives for a nation to build an atomic bomb.
165 Dunn, "Four Decades of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," in Aspen Strategy
Group Report, New Threats, 233.
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U.S. non-proliferation efforts in Latin America should target the
motivations behind a decision to build a nuclear weapon. The reduced
military tensions between Argentina and Brazil offer the U.S. an
opportunity to help create a collective security arrangement eliminating
their nuclear ambitions.
There is disagreement in the United States over how to best achieve
its nuclear non-proliferation goals. There are two different schools of
thought in the U.S. regarding nuclear proliferation in Latin America. The
State Department and Commerce Department see the Guadalajara Accord
as a solution to the nuclear proliferation problem. In this view, Argentina
and Brazil deserve to be rewarded with increased trade, loans, and access to
dual-use technology. The Commerce and State Departments endorse greater
technology transfers because they strengthen U.S. competitiveness and
increase exports. 166
The second school of thought resides in the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and among many nuclear proliferation
experts. This group has a more conservative interpretation of events in
Argentina and Brazil. They oppose the transfer of dual-use technology such
as the sale of an IBM 3090 computer to Brazil. They claim that increased
166 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "A standoff with Brazil on computer," The New
York Times (12 April 1991), CI.
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access to dual-use technology may encourage the development of missiles
and nuclear weapons in third world countries. 167 The Guadalajara
agreement makes a promise, but the capabilities to produce nuclear
weapons are still intact. This group believes that the establishment of full-
scope IAEA safeguards is the best guarantee that future governments will
not "reverse course and resume a nuclear weapons program." 168 The next
sections examine these two schools of thought.
A. TIME TO REWARD A NON-PROLIFERATION SUCCESS
The best example of the differences between these two schools of
thought is the controversial sale of an IBM supercomputer to Brazil. Brazil
had been trying to import a supercomputer for several years to improve
research and design at the Embraer plane factory. This technology transfer
was slowed by various U.S. government agencies including the DOD, DOE,
and ACDA. These agencies maintained that the computer could be used to
design nuclear weapons. They barred the sale in the absence of assurances
from Brazil that the computer would not be used for military purposes. 169
The U.S. State and Commerce Departments wanted to expedite this sale.
President Bush announced approval of the sale prior to his six-day tour of
167 Farnsworth, "A standoff with Brazil on computer," Cl.
168
"The Bomb, in Latin America," The New York Times (3 November 1991),
A19.
169 Brian Robinson, "IBM 3090 going to Brazil," Electronic Engineering
Times (Number 620, 10 December 1990), 14.
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South America intended to promote the idea of a free trade zone between
North and South America.
Despite the sale approval in late November 1990, the shipment of the
IBM supercomputer is delayed because Brazil has failed to provide the
required guarantees that the computer will not be used for military
purposes or be transferred to another country. 170 H. Ross Perot stated:
...[that such a] computer could have been used for nuclear weapons'
development and that both the Commerce and State Departments had
continued to encourage the sale of the computer until it was finally
blocked by the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of
Defense. 171
The State Department's support for technology transfers to Latin
America has increased because of the recent steps taken in Argentina and
Brazil to end nuclear weapons research. The State Department believes
strongly in the need to increase U.S. technology transfers to the region. 172
The problem of nuclear proliferation in Latin America appears to be
resolved; only the formalities need to be completed. The issue of nuclear
170
"Lack of Guarantees holds up delivery of U.S. Supercomputer," Latin
American Regional Reports: Brazil Report (RB-91-04, 2 May 1991), 8.
171 John McCormick, "When was U.S. shipping supercomputers to Hussein?"
(Larry King Show guest H. Ross Perot questions US trade policy in Persian
Gulf), The Larry King Show (Television program on 14 January 1991).
172
"Autonomous Technological Development," Latin American Regional
Reports: Brazil Report (RB-91-06, 11 July 1991), 5.
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proliferation is moot because there is no reason for Argentina or Brazil to
build nuclear weapons. 173
It is likely that Argentina and Brazil will comply fully with the
Treaty of Tlatelolco (possibly during 1992). The reduced military tensions
between Argentina and Brazil have eliminated a primary reason for either
nation to build nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is time to reward the
Guadalajara Accord as a non-proliferation success. The U.S. should offer
debt relief and expand economic relations with Argentina and Brazil.
The rewards from the United States government will be an increase
in trade, loans, and investment. Vice President Quayle's recent visit to
Argentina and Brazil is an example of U.S. efforts to reward non-
proliferation progress in Latin America. Another compensation might be the
debt restructuring benefits of the Brady Plan. President Menem hopes that
Argentina's admission to the Brady Plan will be discussed during his visit
to the United States in November 1991.m
173 A brief explanation of the U.S. State Department's position on
technology transfers to Latin America can be found in "Lack of Guarantees
holds up delivery of U.S. Supercomputer," Latin American Regional Reports:
Brazil Report (RB-91-04, 2 May 1991), 8.
174
"Menem Discusses IMF Talks, Trip to U.S.," (in Spanish), TELAM , 18
September 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS-LAT-91-182, 19 September 1991), 16.
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B. APPLAUD THE PROGRESS, BUT PRESS FOR FULL-SCOPE
SAFEGUARDS
In general, proliferation experts are cautious about announcements
that nuclear issues are "moot." The nuclear facilities and technical
knowledge capable of building nuclear weapons will remain in Argentina
and Brazil. The influx of nuclear specialists from the Soviet Union may even
improve either nation's ability to produce a nuclear weapon. William Potter
has described the potential proliferation danger of Soviet scientists
becoming "nuclear mercenaries." The economic crisis in the Soviet Union
and the declining status of many state-employed scientists may cause an
increase in the emigration of nuclear specialists. Estimates on the number
of Soviets with nuclear experience range from 5,000 to over 100,000
persons. 175
The fear of a potential oil shortage during the Gulf War convinced
Brazil of the need to expand its nuclear energy program. Brazil is seeking to
attract thousands of Soviet scientists to the country. 176 Brazilian
Secretary of Science and Technology Jose Goldemberg confirmed that Brazil
wants to attract university-trained Soviet technicians interested in leaving
175 William C. Potter, presentation on the "The Proliferation Threats and
Nonproliferation Opportunities in a De-Centralized Soviet Union" on 19
November 1991 at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS),
Monterey, CA.
176
"Efforts Under Way To Attract Soviet Scientists," (in Portuguese), O
Globo, 9 July 1991, translated and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS-LAT-91-151, 6 August 1991), 18.
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the Soviet Union. Mr. Goldemberg, a nuclear physicist and strong advocate
of expanding Brazil's nuclear energy capability, stated that their
employment would be financed for at least two years. 177 The potential that
such scientific expertise could be used for military purposes cannot be
ignored.
Argentina and Brazil may not fulfill the promises made in the
Guadalajara Accord. Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley maintain that
the U.S. foreign policy should recognize the possibility that nuclear weapons
research may continue in Argentina and Brazil. The ongoing proliferation
threats in Argentina and Brazil must be considered. Below is a list of
possible factors that would lead Argentina and Brazil to continue the
pursuit of nuclear weapons:
1. The rise of nationalistic political parties in Argentina and/or Brazil
that see non-proliferation pressures by the United States as a vestige of
colonialism. A nationalist movement may reject IAEA inspections
because they represent a tool of "atomic apartheid" or "nuclear
colonialism." 178
2. The return of the military to power through a coup, allowing the
armed forces to pursue nuclear weapons, either overtly or covertly.
3. The collapse of the NPT in 1995 or weakening of the IAEA, increasing
the incentives to build nuclear weapons. If the number of nuclear
177
"Project Confirmed," (in Portuguese), O Globo , 9 July 1991, translated
and reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-91-151, 6
August 1991), 19.
178
Pilat and Pendley, Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime, 161.
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powers increases around the globe, then Argentina and Brazil might
renew nuclear weapons development.
4. The return of high levels of economic growth and prosperity, allowing
investment of excess capital in the nuclear sector.
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States appears to have a credibility problem in the area
of non-proliferation policy. 179 The U.S. has a record of uncertain and
ambivalent non-proliferation leadership. Pakistan, India, and South Africa
were all denied U.S. military aid and nuclear exports at one time. Later, a
reversal in U.S. policy encouraged transfers of military hardware and
nuclear fuel to these countries. The U.S. needs to adopt a high profile,
public commitment to nuclear non-proliferation to reinforce the behind-the-
scenes U.S. diplomacy in foreign capitals. 180 The nuclear non-proliferation
policies of the United States could be improved by the following three
recommendations.
First, the U.S. must complement its global policies (export controls
and regime-building) with regional and country-specific policies. U.S. non-
proliferation policy should be organized around three principles: prevention,
containment, and management on a nation-by-nation basis. 181 Given the
179
Pilat and Pendley, Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime, 159.
180 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,"
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 63.
181 Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull,"
in Aspen Strategy Group Report, New Threats, 63.
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magnitude and diversity of the problem of nuclear proliferation, specifically
tailored initiatives are needed to address the nuclear ambitions of Argentina
and Brazil. The U.S. should not repeat the policy reversals that occurred
with respect to Pakistan, India, and South Africa. The U.S. should be firm
in its insistence on full-scope IAEA safeguards in Argentina and Brazil.
Second, the inherent limits of unilateral U.S. action must be
acknowledged and overcome through multilateral efforts. The U.S. should
encourage greater European and Japanese cooperation in preventing
proliferation, especially in terms of tighter export controls. The end of the
cold war brings opportunities to coordinate the nuclear non-proliferation
policies in the U.S. and former Soviet Union.
The coordination U.S. and Soviet non-proliferation efforts might
encourage an end to many nascent nuclear weapons programs around the
world. William Potter called this a "window of opportunity" where the
successor states of the U.S.S.R. may be encouraged to take steps to
strengthen the NPT, MTCR, IAEA and other international non-proliferation
regimes.
Third, the United States should adopt policies to strengthen the
IAEA. The IAEA performs a critical role in the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. There is a pressing need to review, update, and expand the IAEA
182 William C. Potter in a presentation at Monterey Institute of
International Studies (MIIS) on 22 October 1991 in Monterey, California.
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capabilities. The disclosures that Iraq's nuclear weapons efforts escaped
IAEA safeguards shows the need for the IAEA to adopt random inspections.
The U.S. must work to insure the IAEA remains a "depoliticized" agency
with strong international support, both financial and diplomatic. A research
and development program for the new verification methods should receive
increased funding. It is important to improve the technologies and
procedures to monitor nuclear proliferation.
D. CONCLUSION
The reduction of technology transfers to the Southern Cone would not
guarantee the end of nuclear weapons research, but it might sour relations
between the United States and Argentina and Brazil. Technology transfers
are positive foreign policy tools because they often foster greater
cooperation. Therefore, Argentine and Brazilian access to U.S. technology
should be increased, but not increased blindly. The U.S. should link access
to dual-use technology with the acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards by
Argentina and Brazil.
The Guadalajara Accord offers hope that nuclear proliferation in
Latin America can at least be slowed and perhaps stopped. The
establishment of civilian control over the military and the reduction in the
belligerent rivalry between Argentina and Brazil are central factors in
ending the quest for nuclear weapons. The firm commitment of the civilian
108
leadership in Argentina and Brazil to pursue only peaceful nuclear activities
is a positive sign. The adoption of IAEA full-scope safeguards in Argentina




THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO TRANSPORT NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN AND THROUGH TERRITORIES WITHIN THE ZONE
OF APPLICATION OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
The United States insisted on the following interpretation of the transit
rights under the Treaty of Tlatelolco:
The proposed treaty should impose no prohibition that would restrict the
freedom of transit [ofnuclear weapons] within the Western Hemisphere.
The U.S. policy on the freedom of transit is based on our national
security needs and the vital security needs of the Hemisphere. 183
The United States faced considerable opposition on the transit issue.
Mexico stated that this interpretation undermined the entire purpose of the
treaty. However, the firm U.S. position ensured that the final compromise
allowed each nation in Latin America the "discretion" to permit the transit
of atomic materials through its territory. The U.S. policy of "neither
confirming nor denying" the presence of nuclear weapons on any of its ships
or aircraft traveling through Latin America has continued. Some opposition
to U.S. Navy ship visits exists in Latin America, but, it has been far less
vocal than in other parts of the world. There has not been any confrontation
in Latin America comparable to New Zealand's 1985 decision to refuse ship
visits by nuclear-capable or nuclear-powered ships. 184
183 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Additional Protocol I To
The Treaty For The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America (95th
Congress, 2nd Session, 15 August 1978), 47.
184 Jacob Bercovitch, ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in
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APPENDIX D
President Collor addressed the United Nations General Assembly on 23
September 1991 with the following statement regarding Brazil's nuclear
rapprochement with Argentina:
On 18 July 1991, in Guadalajara, Mexico, we, Brazil and Argentina,
signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This
agreement has great historical significance for our countries and
represents evidence that it is possible to achieve nuclear security
through nuclear cooperation.
The safeguard agreement that, we, Brazil and Argentina, will sign
with the International Atomic Energy Agency will supply all
information necessary to verify our commitment to the peaceful use of
nuclear energy and will preserve the technological achievements in
the mastery of the atomic cycle that we arduously reached.
Furthermore, a month ago we signed the Mendoza Agreement with
Argentina and Chile, formalizing our mutual rejection of chemical
and biological weapons.
Brazil understands the aforementioned agreements comprise a full
and sufficient guarantee of the peaceful purposes of our nuclear
program and our repudiation of weapons of mass destruction.
...We must find formulas to reconcile two basic interests: preventing
the dissemination of technology for production of weapons of mass
destruction and keeping open the channels to obtain these
technologies for peaceful uses. 185
185
"Collor Addresses U.N. General Assembly," (in Portuguese), Rio de
Janeiro Rede Globo Television, 23 September 1991, translated and reported in
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